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I COMMENTARY
The Game Changer: How the P5 Caused a
Paradigm Shift in Norm Diffusion Post-9/11
CATHERINE MOORE*
This Commentagy recognizes a policy shift across nations of favoring
national security over human rights and argues that smaller states were
influenced by the ky international decision makers, the Permanent Five
Members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council, via norm diffusion. In
doing so, it offers an alternative theory for how and why human rights norms
have consistenty been violated in the pursuit of security. Oppressive regimes
have used the term "counterterrorism" or "national security" to justif rights
violations because they see larger powers allowing these violations. This
Commentary contends that the P5 are responsible for beginning this
phenomenon and in doing so created a paradigm shift in the tpes of norms that
are diffusedglobaly, resulting in "negative norm diffusion."
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INTRODUCTION
'f allyourfriendsjumped off a bridge, wouldyou?"
It is perhaps one of the oldest questions that a parent will ask a child
after he or she uses the excuse that "everyone else was doing it" to justify
his or her behavior. Post-9/1 prioritization of security over human rights
has operated in a similar fashion, despite obligations to respect and protect
human rights. This begs the question of why and how states felt justified
in this prioritization. When and where did this prioritization originate and
how has this prioritization spread throughout so many different states?
National security and human rights have long been at a crossroads.'
Counterterrorism measures in the post-9/11 era have tested the tension
that exists between these two areas of law. "How resilient is the human
1. See, e.g., HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel 53(4) PD
817 [1999] (Isr.), translated in 14 Isr. L. Rep. 567, 605 (1998-1999) ("We are aware that this decision
[allowing the defense of necessity for torture] does make it easier to deal with that reality [of Israel's
difficult situation]. This is the destiny of democracy - it does not see all means as acceptable, and the
ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand
tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an
individual constitute important components in its understanding of security. At the end of the day,
they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties."); Ben Golder &
George Williams, Balancing National Securi~y and Human Rights: Assessing the Legal Response of Common
Law Nations to the Thrat of Terrorism, 8 J. COMP. POLY ANALYSIS 43 (2006) (advocating a balancing
approach to these competing norms).
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rights norm in the counter-terrorist era?"2 scholar Rosemary Foot asked at
the height of the debate on national security and human rights during the
Bush Presidency. While she focuses on the work of the committees
created by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 and 1373,
3
her question remains relevant today as human rights are continually tested
by counterterrorism measures and their implementation by states.
Although the UN committee procedures in place today actually afford
greater attention to human rights than ever before, they have been altered
to do so.4 Human rights in the days following 9/11 were not a priority for
many and remain a low priority for those states that feel justified in
ignoring their obligations.5 But how far have we truly come?
Many states across the globe are dealing with varying levels of security
threats,6 and unfortunately, most respond with policy shifts or changes in
law that restrict fundamental rights, as this Commentary will demonstrate.
Human rights protections have been compromised for the sake of security
and justified, for example, under the derogation clauses of treaties.7 In
particular, freedom of speech has been restricted;8 detentions have been
indefinite and arbitrary;9 and torture has been justified'O - all in the name
of security.
2. Rosemary Foot, The United Nations, Counter Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation
and Embedded Ideas, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 489, 489 (2007).
3. Id. at 490.
4. Id.
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES WORLDWIDE (2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM], availabk at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/counter-terrorism-
bck_0.pdf. According to a Human Rights Watch study, more than 140 countries either enacted or
revised one or more counterterrorism laws since 9/11, and at least 130 such laws included one or
more provisions that could be used to violate human rights. Globak 140 Count'ies Pass Counterterror
Laws Since 9/11, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 29, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/201 2/06/29/global-140-countries-pass-counterterror-laws911; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY: COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS WORLDWIDE SINCE
SEPTEMBER 11, at 5 (2012), availabk at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/global06l2ForUpload-l.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY].
6. See NAT'L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
[START], GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE (2013), available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
7. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant
may take measures derogating from their obligations ... ."); Derek Jinks, International Human Rigbts
Law and the War on Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 58 (2003) (rationalizing the "War on
Terror" as a public emergency and therefore concluding that it fulfills the obligation for derogation).
8. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1. (freedom of speech in the P5) & III.C. (P5 influence on states
such as Turkey and Zimbabwe).
9. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2. (arbitrary detention in the P5) & II.C. (P5 influence on states
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yemen).
10. See discussion infra Parts III.A.3. (torture in the P5) & III.C. (P5 influence on states such as
Macedonia and Sweden).
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Currently, Jordan is modifying legislation with a new definition of
terrorism that now includes "any act meant to create sedition, harm
property or jeopardise international relations, or to use the Internet or
media outlets to promote 'terrorist' thinking."" In Egypt, an expansion in
the definition of terrorism would make simply holding a leadership
position in the Muslim Brotherhood an offense punishable by death.12 In
Saudi Arabia, terrorism has been redefined to cover anyone who "[c]alls
for atheist thought in any form, or call[s] into question the fundamentals
of the Islamic religion on which this country is based[,] [a]nyone who
disregards their loyalty to the country's rulers," and anyone who "[i]ncites
or make[s] countries, committees, or international organisations
antagonistic to the kingdom."'13 Freedom of speech and the press is at risk
worldwide, as journalists and human rights defenders continue to be
imprisoned as they report on anti-government protests or speak out
against their governments.14
This Commentary will consider how states first perceived themselves
able to introduce measures that circumvent these protected rights. In the
area of counterterrorism, the choice of national security over protection
of human rights can be linked to the theory of securitization. Under this
theory, policy makers reframe a policy issue and then link that newly
framed policy to security.15 For example, the denial of water rights could
be linked to security, requiring the authorities to step in and impose martial
law to enforce the policy. After a number of such policy decisions, the
public comes to accept these limitations over a period of time in the name
of security. Thus, the restriction of human rights in the name of security
becomes the norm.
Was the circumvention of rights an instinctual reaction to protecting
state interests, as the theory of securitization suggests?16 Or, as this
11. Areej Abuqudairi, Jordan Anti-Terrorism Law Sparks Concern, AL JAZEERA, Apr. 25, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/jordan-anti-terrorism-law-sparks-concern-
201442510452221775.html.
12. Erin Cunningham, Egyptian Draft Laws to Widen Terror' Definition Drawing Fierce Critidsm,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypt-draft-law-to-widen-
terror-definition/2014/04/19/e79e5f3a-7725-4a25-a43a-0e005aa99b69_story.html.
13. Ludovica laccino, Saudi Arabia: New Law Defines Atbeism as Terrorism, INT'L BUS. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2014, http://www.ibimes.co.uk/saudi-arabia-new-law-sees-atheism-terrorism-1442819.
14. See Press Release, U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, UN Experts Urge
Ethiopia to Stop Using Anti-terrorism Legislation to Curb Human Rights (Sept. 18, 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DispayNews.aspx?NewslD=15056&LangID=E#
ssthas.dB5hpGEC.dpuf; Amy Brouillette, Crackdown on Journaists: State Secuyify vs Human Rights, AL
JAZEERA, Apr. 21, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opirtion/2014/04/crackdown-
journalists-state-sec-201442153837498790.html; Disproportionate Penalties for Media in Cameroon's Anti-
Terrorism Law, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://en.rsf.org/cameroon-
disproportionate-penalties-for-18-12-2014,47401 .html.
15. See BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 23-24 (1998).
16. See id. (noting that securitization occurs when an "issue is presented as an existential threat,
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Commentary will suggest, do weaker or smaller states look to more
powerful states to see how far they can go and still be within an
internationally respectable range of restrictions?
The initial reaction to the events of 9/11 - to restrict rights and
prioritize security in the days following the attacks - is not surprising in
many ways. Some would argue that this shift in counterterrorism laws was
a necessary byproduct of 9/11, and indeed, the threat of a terrorist attack
still looms.17 However, such a rationale does not explain the widespread
and continued restriction of rights across the globe more than a decade
after 9/11, especially when some states, like Antigua and Barbuda18 or
Vanuatu,19 have never been victims of a terror attack linked to Al Qaeda.20
This Commentary will suggest that the policy shift is not attributable to
securitization but, rather, to the influence of other states on
counterterrorism policy.
This Commentary will argue that the "other states" that influence the
rest of the world are the Permanent Five (P5) of the United Nations
Security Council. Although it was noted by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an
Egyptian human rights activist, that "[e]very dictator in the world is using
what the United States has done under the Patriot Act and other derivative
measures to justify their past violations of human rights, as well as
declaring a license to continue to abuse human rights at present and in the
future,"21 the United States was not acting alone post-9/1 1. The influence
requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of
political procedure").
17. Examples of recent terrorist attacks include the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi,
Libya, as well as attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq, al
Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haran in Nigeria.
18. For Antigua & Barbuda's anti-terrorism legislation, see Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,
No. 12 (2005), art. 22 (Ant. & Barb.) (allowing a judge to authorize the detention of an individual
suspected of terrorism for up to five days without charge); see also COMMONWEALTH HUMAN
RIGHTS INITIATIVE, ANTIGUA & BARBUDA COUNTRY REPORT: ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS &
POLICING 1 (2007), available at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publicatidons/chogm/chogrn2007/docs/country-_reports/07
1011_chogm07_antigua_&_barbuda nti terrorism-policing__country.report2007.pdf ("Antigua and
Barbuda's adoption of terrorism legislation was in response to international obligations since 2001
and can also be linked to pressure resulting from its economic relationship with the [United States]
and [United Kingdom].').
19. See, e.g., Vanuatu Jounaist Arrested over Social Media Post, AUSTRALIAN BROAD. CORP., May 6,
2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-07/an-vanuatu-joumalist-arrested/4674078 (describing
charges against Vanuatu journalist for social media post apparently misconstrued as supporting
terrorism).
20. START, supra note 6 (recording only two terrorism-type instances in Antigua and Barbuda,
1992 and 1997, neither of which was attributable to Al Qaeda, and only two instances in Vanuatu,
both in 1996, each of which was attributable to the Vanuatu Mobile Force).
21. CARTER CTR_, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS ON THE FRONTLINES OF FREEDOM:
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 29 (2004), available at
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1682.pdf.
[Vol. 55:1
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of the P5 spread via norm diffusion to other states that modeled their own
behavior after the power elite, thereby furthering the view that security is
the priority in the face of terrorism.
Part I will assess the literature, exploring counterterrorism measures and
their relation to human rights. Additionally, it will review the theory of
norm diffusion and the role that the P5 play in diffusing norms. Finally, it
will introduce and summarize the new normative theory of negative
norm diffusion.
Part II will outline the research framework and methodology to be used
in order to evaluate the theory of negative norm diffusion explained
in Part I.
Part III will test the theory of negative norm diffusion by
demonstrating that there has been a shift in how the world analyzes
counterterrorism measures and human rights. P5 case studies will illustrate
how these states individually passed domestic laws that violated human
rights obligations - particularly freedom of speech, the prohibition of
arbitrary detention, and the prohibition of torture - in favor of
counterterrorism measures. Part III will identify further support through
examination of UNSCR 1373 and its implementation and through case
studies of states across various regions that were both members and non-
members of the United Nations as of the passage of UNSCR 1373.
Part IV will conclude that the influence of the P5 has led to a shift in
counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights. States
emulate the actions of the P5 with regard to the drafting of their own
counterterrorism measures in order to gain international acceptance.
Additionally, states emulate and learn from the rights-violating behavior
that they observe of the P5. States are also coerced into breaching these
obligations, typically through individual state pressure, and feel compelled
to mimic these counterterrorism measures in order to stay "competitive."
However, preexisting repressive regimes cannot be discounted in this
discussion, as they often look to what other states are doing to further
justify their own actions.
I. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR NEGATIVE NORM DIFFUSION:
VIEWING COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
THE LENS OF NORM DIFFUSION
A. Relationship Between Counterterrorism Measures and Human Rzghts
There has been a long-running debate as to whether national security
and counterterrorism measures should take priority over human rights
194 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
obligations.22 Described as a "significant casualty of the struggle against
terrorism,"23 human rights have often been relegated to second-tier
commitments. While it is not the purpose of this Commentary to take a
position on whether security or human rights has more value in the
international system, it is necessary to recognize the underlying issues in
the debate.
For example, Andrea Bianchi, renowned scholar in international law and
terrorism, asserts in his book, Enforcing International Law Norms Against
Terrorism, that there is actually no real difficulty in the debate between the
two concepts of security and human rights. He attributes a state's
disregard of human rights obligations to the fact that the state's ratification
of human rights treaties does not actually mean protection of human
rights. Bianchi argues that ratification provides only the appearance of
human rights protection.24 These accusations of state self-satisfaction
correspond with many scholars' questioning whether or not human rights
treaties and their ratification even matter.25
Nevertheless, counterterrorism measures, implemented both
internationally and domestically, have had a significant impact on the
protection of human rights. With the passage of UNSCR 1373, the
dynamic between the two competing norms shifted, although they
theoretically should be able to coexist.26 In fact, scholars,27 courts,28 and
22. See, e.g., Itzhak Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 23 ISR. L. REV. 375 (1989); Anthony
Lewis, Address, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 257 (2003); Rosa Ehrenreich
Brooks, War Eveywhere: Rights, National Securiy Law, and the Law ofArmed Conflct in the Age of Terror,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004); Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democray against Terrorism - Protection
of Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest - the Proper Balance, 37 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 27 (2004); Lucia Zedner, Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror Reflections from Criminal Justice, 32 J.L. &
SoC'Y 507 (2005); Tiberiu Dragu, Is There a Trade-off Between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Pivagy
Protections, and Terrorism Prevention, 105 AM. POL. SC. REv. 64 (2011).
23. Foot, supra note 2, at 490.
24. Andrea Bianchi, Conclusions: Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism: Achievements and
Prospects, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMiS AGAINST TERRORISM 491, 525 (Andrea
Bianchi ed., 2004) (calling a state's agreement to protect such rights an indulgence "in a rhetorical
exercise of self-complacency").
25. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939
(2002) (addressing whether human rights treaties make a difference in the actual protection of human
rights through a "large-scale quantitative analysis of the relationship between human rights treaties
and countries' human rights practices"); Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights
Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 612 (2007) (finding that states' decisions to commit to human
rights treaties depend in part on the likely domestic effects of implementation); Eric Neumayer, Do
International Human Rsghts Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 925
(2005) (indicating "that rarely does treaty ratification have unconditional effects on human ights,"
but rather, "improvement in human rights is typically more likely the more democratic the country").
26. See, e.g., Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, The Legislative Role of the Security Council in Its Fight
Against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical Limits, 57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 333, 342 (2008) ("With...
Resolution [1373], for the first time the [U.N. Security Council] acted by establishing general,
permanent obligations, unconnected to any given controversy. They are new obligations ... created
by the [Security Council], so the argument that this institution is limited to codifying pre-existing law
[Vol. 55:1
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the UN Charter itself29 recognize that the Security Council is bound by the
UN Charter and, by default, its human rights obligations.
Because UNSCR 1373 required that all states adopt counterterrorism
legislation, without further specifying what this requirement actually
entailed, oppressive regimes were able to justify restriction of human
rights under their UNSCR 1373 obligations.30 As a prime example, Cuba
submitted an extensive report of the "terrorist woes allegedly suffered ...
[in an] attempt to justify Cuba's penal legislation against 'saboteurs and
terrorists'... [and] the Central Bank of Cuba's abundant efforts to patrol
all 'suspicious' financial transactions."31 Although the restriction of rights
in an abusive regime such as Cuba remains a concern for the international
human rights community, including the United Nations itself, the Council
appears to "endorse a template of 'model' counter terrorism domestic
legislation that condones or ignores universal human rights standards."32
There are many different rights and freedoms implicated in
counterterrorism laws themselves. This Commentary focuses, however, on
three of the key human rights issues at stake - freedom of speech,
cannot be defended. The Resolution imposes on all States, independently of their relation to the
terrorist phenomenon, the adoption of a series of penal, administrative and procedural measures that
require legislative reforms in national law." (internal citations omitted)); Andrew Hudson, Not a Great
Asset: The UN Securie Counil's Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 203 (2007).
27. See, e.g., Nicholas Angelet, International Law Limits to the Securiy Council, in UNITED NATIONS
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 71, 74 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds., 2001); lain
Cameron, UN Tatgeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights, 72
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 159 (2003); Christopher C. Joyner, The United Nations and Terrorism: Rethinking
Legal Tensions Between National Securiy, Human Rsghts and Civil Liberties, 5 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 240
(2004); Clmentine Olivier, Human Rights Law and the International Fight Against Terrorism: How Do
Security Council Resolutions Impact on States' Obligations Under International Human Rights Law? (Revisiting
Securiy Council Resolution 1373), 73 NORDICJ. INT'L L. 399 (2004).
28. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) ("[Nleither
the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound
by law).").
29. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2 ("In discharging these duties [of maintaining international peace
and security] the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations.').
30. Jos6 E. Alvarez, The UN's 'War' on Terrorism, 31 INT'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 238, 246-47 (2003); see
also Martha Mendoza, Global Terrorism: 35,000 Worldwide Convicted for Terror Offenses Since September 11
Attacks, WORLD POST (Nov. 3, 2011, 5:12 AM),
http://-vww.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/03/terrorism-convictions-since-sept-1 1-n947865.html
(quoting John Bellinger, former legal adviser to the U.S. State Department, as saying that "[more
authoritarian countries are using the real threat of terrorism as an excuse and a cover to crack down
in ways that are abusive of human rights").
31. Alvarez, supra note 30, at 246; see also Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Comm., Letter
dated 9 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established pursuant to
Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security
Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2002/15 (Jan. 2, 2002) (submitting Cuba's report).
32. Alvarez, supra note 30, at 247.
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arbitrary detention, and torture. These issues are the most implicated in
laws enacted to combat terrorism and, as such, a precarious balance exists
between combating terrorism, on the one hand, and protecting freedom
of speech and preventing arbitrary detention and torture, on the other. A
tip of the scales in the wrong direction could have dire consequences.
There have been multiple studies on the relationship between the
infringement of these very rights and terrorist attacks.33 One such study
concluded that there is a correlation between respecting these rights and
observing fewer terrorist attacks.34 Others conclude that the abuse of
these protected rights actually promotes and encourages terrorism.35 Given
these findings, it is most troubling that both the P5 and other states
continue to perpetuate violations of these rights in the name of security.
Counterterrorism measures are viewed by states as a positive step
towards the protection of international peace and security. As the world
united post-9/1 1 for the greater good of combating Al Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden, measures were adopted in many countries across the globe to
prevent the spread of terrorism. Some of these measures, including
implementing new law and changing old definitions, were adopted at an
alarmingly fast rate and many with little or no debate.36
This begs the questions, though, of how these measures have affected
the protection of human rights and whether any lack of protection
constitutes a global trend.37 Therefore, counterterrorism measures should
be explored in light of the concept of norm diffusion to fully appreciate
the global aspect of the trend to compromise human rights in the name
of security.
33. See, e.g., Alberto Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
50 (2006) (finding that states that guarantee individual participation in the political process experience
a reduction in terrorism); Max Abrahms, Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists, 16 SECURITY
STUD. 223 (2007) (concluding that states that guarantee the right o freedom of expression,
association, and personal autonomy reduce terrorism).
34. SeeJames 1. Walsh & James A. Piazza, Wlhy Repteeing Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism, 43
COMP. POL. STUD. 551 (2010); see also James A. Piazza & James I. Walsh, Transnational Terror and
Human Rights, 53 INT'L STUD. Q. 125 (2009); James Walsh, Does Torture Stop Terror? Nope.,
PREVENTING TORTURE WITHIN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (Int'l Rehab. Council for
Torture Victims, Copenhagen, Den.), May 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.irct.org/Fies/Filer/publications/Torture-terror/TortureTerrorNewsletterl 3_May09.p
df.
35. See, e.g., Andreas E. Feldmann & Maiju Perfli, Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism
in Latin America, 46 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 101 (2004) (suggesting that terrorist attacks are more
likely in regions and areas that restrict or do not protect human rights and where rule of law is weak
or unstable).
36. Beth Elise Whitaker, Exporting the Patriot Act? Democragy and the 'War on Terror' in the Third
World, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1017 (2007) (conducting an empirical study on over forty states,
focusing on Third World countries, and identifying the level of debate on counterterrorism legislation
in those states).
37. Bianchi, supra note 24, at 491.
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B. Norm Diffusion in International Relations Theory
There has been a substantial amount of literature focusing on norm
creation, evolution, and diffusion in international relations theory.38 The
literature discusses the various ways in which states are impacted. As
"[i]nternational interdependence is at the core of the international
relations discipline,"39 it is no wonder that we find ourselves in an
increasingly connected, globalized world.
Scholars observe that "[i]nternational [norm] diffusion occurs when
government policy decisions in a given country are systematically
conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries."40 The end
result adopted by a given state is directly related to the actions, policy
implementation, or the laws enacted and enforced by another state.41 It is
often evidenced through the examination of a particular law enacted or
the parliamentary debates surrounding its implementation. External
evidence, such as external funding tied to a change in the law, can also
prove the existence of norm diffusion.
1. Ways in Which Norms Diffuse
The literature on the various ways in which norms diffuse through
different actors is expansive and well-grounded in international relations
theory. In his seminal chapter in the Handbook for International Relations,
international relations scholar Fabrizio Gilardi focuses on four modes of
norm diffusion covered by the literature: coercion, competition, learning,
and emulation.42 Coercion involves one or multiple states pressuring other
38. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed.
1979); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Internalional Norm Dynamics and Poflical Change, 52 INT'L
ORG. 887 (1998); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International
Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479 (1990); Richard A. Posner, SodalNorms and the Law:An Economic Approacb,
87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997).
39. Fabrizio Gilardi, Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 453, 453 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2013).
40. Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The Diffusion of~iberak.Zation, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION
OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 1, 7 (Beth A. Simmons et al. eds., 2007).
41. See, e.g., David Strang & Sarah A. Soule, Diffusion in OrganiZations and Social Movements: From
Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 265, 266 (1998) ("Diffusion refers to the spread of
something within a social system. The key term here is 'spread,' and it should be taken.., to denote
flow or movement from a source to an adopter, paradigmatically via communication and
influence.... [T]he term 'practice' ... denote[s] the diffusing item, which might be a behavior,
strategy, belief, technology, or structure. Diffusion is the most general and abstract erm we have for
this sort of process, embracing contagion, mimicry, social learning, organized dissemination, and
other family members.").
42. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 460; see also Frank Dobbin et al., The Global Diffusion of Public Polities:
Social Construction, Coercion, Competiion, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 449, 454 (2007) ("Coercion
typically involves a change in incentives to nations, as when the World Bank conditions aid on fiscal
austerity or when the United States implies that tariff reduction will put a nation in America's
good graces.").
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states into compliance with a given norm.43 Through competition, "policy
makers anticipate or react to the behavior of other countries in order to
attract or retain economic resources."44 Learning implies that a state
observes the results of an action in another state to better estimate the
likely consequences in its own.45 As distinguished from learning, emulation
is simply "the process whereby policies diffuse because of their normative
and socially constructed properties instead of their objective
characteristics."
46
The peer pressure of coercion has many different venues for norm
diffusion. One key example is development assistance by both the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which requires
that states intending to borrow funds adhere to certain requirements,
which typically involve increasing trade output while at the same time
reducing expenses domestically.47 An additional type of coercion exists for
European Union membership, as a state must adhere to the entirety of the
EU's regulations, including human rights, trade, and tax regulations and
treaty obligations, prior to being accepted into the Union.48 Although the
43. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 461; see also JOHN R. HALL, COERCION AND CONSENT: STUDIES
ON THE MODERN STATE (1994); Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 38.
44. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 462; see also Philipp Genschel, GlobaliZation, Tax Competition, and the
Welfare State, 30 POL. & SOC'Y 245 (2002).
45. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 463-64; see also Helge J6rgens, Governance by Diffusion: Implementing
Global Norms Through Cross-National Imitation and Learning, in GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTING FORM TO FUNCTION 246 (William M. Lafferty
ed., 2004); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); David P.
Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Poly Transfer in Contemporay Poligy-Making
13 GOVERNANCE 5 (2000).
46. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 466; see also Daniel Brinks & Michael Coppedge, Diffusion Is No
Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democragy, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 463 (2006); Finnemore
& Sikkink, supra note 38; Jrrgens, supra note 45; James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional
Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT'L ORG. 943 (1998); Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G.
Zucker, Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service
Reform, 1880-1935, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 22, 26 (1983) ("[O]rganizations conform to what is societally
defined as appropriate and efficient, largely disregarding the actual impact on organizational
performance." (internal citations omitted)).
47. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 461 ("Mnternational financial institutions (IFIs) such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank tie their financial help to mostly neoliberal
economic reforms to be enacted by the recipient governments, usually some combination of fiscal
austerity and market creation." (internal citations omitted)); see also Thomas J. Biersteker, Reducing the
Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual Exloration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions, 34 INT'L
STUD. Q. 477 (1990); Dobbin et al., supra note 42 ("[T]he preferences of the U.S. government, the
European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank may shape
policy in countries reliant on those entities for trade, foreign direct investment, aid, grants, loans,
or security.'.
48. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 461 ("[Ihe EU makes accession conditional on wide-ranging
reforms, including the national transposition of EU legislation and the restructuring of domestic
political institutions and practices. If these efforts are successful, they cause policies to spread quite
straightforwardly.'); see also Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier, Governance by Conditionality:
EU Rule Tranifr to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
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adherence to all EU regulations is linked to EU treaty obligations, of
which a given state was aware prior to signing the treaty, this does not
make the process of compliance any less coercive.
49
In order to better explain the concept of competition, the literature
relies on examples related to economic growth, focusing on tax rates and
product standards.50 For example, a lower tax rate in a state makes it more
attractive to development and new businesses, which in turn stimulates
economic growth.51 Because of these incentive effects, multiple states
compete with each other to attract new business to their own state. Some
states even lower taxes in a "tit for tat" fashion to stay competitive.
52
However, this mode of norm diffusion is not limited to economic issues.
In light of national security, the intergroup competition amongst states as
a result of the Cold War resulted in the nuclear arms race, which pushed
both powerful and developing states to strive to acquire nuclear weapons.
53
This security facet of diffusion via competition cannot be overlooked.
Diffusion via learning allows policy makers to observe actual results in
another state prior to implementation in their own.54 In fact, a state is
more likely to adopt a new norm if it has already been tested.55 However,
it is important to note that even if a state observes a norm in another
state, which has similar conditions to its own, the outcome is not always
guaranteed to be the same, and, in fact, states often "draw the wrong
lessons from observation."5 6 Merely copying and pasting legislation that
11 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 918 (2004).
49. See Dobbin et al., supra note 42, at 457 ("In empirical investigations of conditionality, it is
necessary to identify the coercive actors, to show that they promote the policy in question, and to
show evidence that their promotion increases the likelihood of policy adoption. Studies should be
designed to demonstrate that countries subject to leverage (trade, aid, or security dependence) are
more likely, ceteris paribus, to adopt reforms promoted by powerful actors.").
50. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 462; see also GEOFFREY GARRET, PARTISAN POLITICS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998); Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 825 (2006); David Vogel, Trading up and Governing
Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y. 556, 561-62 (1997)
("Political jurisdictions which have developed stricter product standards often force foreign
producers in nations with weaker domestic standards... to design products that meet those
standards, since otherwise they will be denied access to its markets.').
51. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 462.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., William C. Potter, The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, in THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY AND IDEAS 146 (Emily 0. Goldman & Leslie C. Eliason eds., 2003).
54. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 463-66; see also COVADONGA MESEGUER, LEARNING, POLICY
MAKING, AND MARKET REFOR'MS (2009); Elkins et al., supra note 49, at 831-33; Dobbin et al., supra
note 42, at 460 ("International policy diffusion can therefore occur when policy makers update their
beliefs about what will work in their country on the basis of other countries' experiences.").
55. Gilardi, spra note 39, at 466 ("[E]mpirical evidence tends to support the idea that policy
makers are more likely to adopt a policy if it was successful elsewhere, which suggests that they learn
from the experience of others.").
56. Dobbin et al., supra note 42, at 463.
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works in State A will not necessarily have the same effect in State B, in
which case true learning has not occurred. This may, however,
be emulation.
Emulation is not centered on the consequences of an action like the
other modes of diffusion. Rather, it is centered on the "logic of
appropriateness," which is explained by the social construct aspect of
emulation.5 7 Frank Dobbin and others refer to emulation as social
constructivism, relying on the "social acceptance" of a policy. This is
merely another name for emulation in the literature, whereby "leading
countries serve as exemplars."5 8 Once a norm has become so widely
practiced, it is often perceived to be the only appropriate avenue
of action.59
2. Types of Norms Diffused
As evidenced in the literature, norm diffusion is typically viewed as a
process by which "good" norms are promulgated.60 For example,
international humanitarian law and the tenets of the Red Cross spread
through norm diffusion so as to protect the wounded, medical personnel,
and the civilian population during armed conflict.61 Women's suffrage is
now virtually universal.62 The use of election monitors has become a norm
that has taken shape over the past sixty years in an attempt to show the
world that a state is pro-democracy.63 These norms represent the
quintessential norm to be spread - one that protects or promotes human
rights or human dignity.
57. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 466; see also Jeffrey T. Checkel, InternationalInstitutions and Socialization
in Europe: Introduction and Framework, 59 INT'L ORG. 801 (2005); Tolbert & Zucker, supra note 46,
at 26.
58. Dobbin et al., supra note 42, at 452.
59. Gilardi, supra note 39, at 467 ("[1]f this process is strong enough, norms may become so
deeply accepted that they end up being taken for granted as the only appropriate type of behavior.
This is the 'internalization stage."'); see also Hiro Katsumata, Mimetic Adoption and Norm Diffusion:
'Western'Securily Cooperation in SoutbeastAsia?, 37 REV. INT'L STUD. 557 (2011); Finnemore & Sikkink,
supra note 38 (discussing the phenomenon of "norm cascade').
60. See, e.g., Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign
Human Rtghts Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the
Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 562 (2000) (discussing the "protection of children" as a
basic norm).
61. Finnemore & Sikkink, spra note 38, at 897.
62. Id.; see also Francisco 0. Ramirez et al., The Changing Logic of Poltical CitiZenship: Cross-National
Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890-1990, 62 AM. Soc. REV. 735 (1997).
63. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Observers Observed: The Rise of Election Monitoring, 8 J.
DEMOCRACY 17 (1997); Susan D. Hyde, Catb Us if You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm
Diffusion, 55 AM. J. POL. SCL. 356 (2011); Judith Kelley, Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The
Rise of International Election Monitoring, 62 INT'L ORG. 221 (2008); Roland Rich, Bringing Democragy into
International Law, 12 J. DEMOCRACY 20 (2001); Arturo Santa-Cruz, Constitutional Structures, Sovereigny,
and the Emergence of Norms: The Case of International Election Monitoring, 59 INT'L ORG. 663 (2005).
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Outside the scope of human rights, the former arms race has taken a
modern turn towards disarmament through treaties and conventions
restricting the types of arms available. Small arms control64 and the
banning of landmines,65 in particular, are two such security norms that
stand out as being separate from a discussion of human rights but are still
viewed as "good" norms that spread.
The literature on norm diffusion, until recently, has focused only on
such positive norms. As will be discussed below,66 the idea that negative
norms can be diffused in the same way has yet to be fully explored.
3. Forums for Norm Diffusion
States as norm diffusers require a way to diffuse a norm, and there are a
variety of forums where this can occur.67 Policy can be diffused via
international organizations, such as the United Nations, or other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and actors.68 The Bretton Woods
institutions are an example of how an international organization (10)
might spread and diffuse norms.69 Oftentimes, NGOs have great influence
on decision makers within a state, through various campaigns or
civic engagement.
70
Although the United Nations was not specifically designed with norm
diffusion in mind, it does have the "advantage of resources and leverage
over weak or developing states [that international organizations, like the
United Nations,] seek to convert to their normative convictions."7
1
Returning to the example of small arms, the creation by the United
64. See DENISE GARCIA, SMALL ARMS AND SECURITY: NEW EMERGING INTERNATIONAL
NORMS 45-46 (2006).
65. To WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES (Maxwell A.
Cameron et al. eds., 1998); Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses,
and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 561 (2003).
66. See infra Part I.D.
67. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 38, at 897; see also Liesbet Hooghe, Several Roads Lead to
International Norms, but Few Via International Sociahiation: A Case Study of the European Commission, 59
INT'L ORG. 861 (2005).
68. See, e.g., Simmons et al., supra note 40; David H. Bearce & Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental
Organizations, Sociaization, and Member-State Interest Convergence, 61 INT'L ORG. 703 (2007); Martha
Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Oqganization and Science Poliy, 47 INT'L ORG. 565 (1993); Katharina Figlister, Wber Does
Learning Take Place? The Role of Intergovernmental Cooperation in Poiiy Diffusion, 51 EUR. J. POL. RES. 316
(2012).
69. See, e.g., SUSAN PARK & ANTJE VETIrERLEIN, OWNING DEVELOPMENT: CREATING POLICY
NORMS IN THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 287 (2010); Biersteker, supra note 47.
70. See, e.g., Strang & Soule, supra note 41, at 272 ("In social movements, experts cannot be
distinguished so easily from adopters, as activists move seamlessly across the two roles. But it is clear
that strategies and tactics are often imported into local settings.").
71. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 38, at 900.
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Nations of a Panel of Experts on Small Arms and a subsequent
conference on illegal trafficking in arms actually spurred states to action.72
This promoted and developed the norm of small arms control. The idea,
therefore, that a norm diffuser could be a group of states acting
collectively, as the United Nations does, is feasible.
When discussing the role that the United Nations plays in diffusing
norms related to counterterrorism, the specific role of the P5 and the
Security Council must be examined in order to appreciate the magnitude
of their power and influence.
C Role of the P5 and Security Coundl in Norm Diffusion
The scope of literature is extremely large and varied when dealing with
issues of national security, counterterrorism, and human rights, as this
became a "hot topic" issue post-9/1 1. While useful for their summary of
these issues, prior articles often focus on a broad, universal study, examine
in depth a single state, or are confined to certain geographic or cultural
areas (i.e., former Commonwealth states, EU states, etc.).73 None of these
studies investigates the true power core of the United Nations - the
Permanent Five Members of the Security Council. The P5 present an
opportunity for an interesting case study of norm diffusion since their
actions arguably have immense influence on other states' actions. This
Commentary intends to show that this is particularly true in the area of
counterterrorism laws in relation to human rights protection.
1. The P5 and Securioy CoundlAre Norm Dffusers
It is indisputable that the Security Council wields an enormous amount
of power both within the UN system - mainly due to the Council's
mandate to maintain international peace and security and its authority to
pass binding Chapter VI resolutions74 - and in everyday international
relations. The individual P5 states hold a significant amount of political
power in their capacity on the Council. The policy decisions made by the
P5, both as a collective unit in the Security Council and individually as a
part of their respective national security agendas, have impacted the
international community.
In order to understand how and why the P5 have such an impact
outside the Council, it is important to understand international relations
72. GARCIA, supra note 64, at 45-46.
73. See Kent Roach, Sources and Trends in Post 9-11 Anti-Terrorism Laws, in SECURITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 227 (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007) [hereinafter Roach, Sources and Trends];
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emerenmy: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Other Peope's PattiotActs: Europe's Response to September
11, 50 Loy. L. REv. 89 (2004).
74. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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theory. The "reference group approach" theorizes the reason why states
mimic other states' behavior.75 A reference group is a group of "states that
set and enforce standards of behaviour for other states, or are accepted by
the political elites of other states as an appropriate source of information
for making judgments about the legitimacy and adequacy of their
actions."76 The P5 is the ultimate example of a reference group. Reference
groups are, in fact, a forum for emulation. This Commentary argues that
other states look to the P5 as a reference group to see what the P5 states
are doing, both in and out of the Council, and to emulate their behavior.
"Thematic Issues of Peace and Security" (TIPS) resolutions are
evidence of the Council's role itself as a norm diffuser.77 TIPS resolutions
are non-coercive resolutions that apply to all states and are non-geographic
and non-situation specific.78 These resolutions address a broad range of
issues, including women's and children's rights, child soldiers, disarmament,
and terrorism.79 Although these resolutions are non-coercive, the fact that
states often look to them as a guide for behavior is evidence that the P5,
through the work of the Council, are key norm diffusers.
8 0
2. Types of Norms Diffused by the P5 and the Councl
In general, the P5 and the Council are thought to be promoters of
"good" norms, just like the United Nations itself and other lOs.81 One of
the Council's goals and missions is to "spread, inculcate, and enforce
global values and norms," but this often depends on the Council's capacity
to persuade and effect change within states.82 In the Council, there is an
interesting power dynamic between the P5 and the rest of the Council,
with the P5 influencing the resolutions that are passed, which norms
spread, and which norms lie dormant.83
75. See Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Reference Group Perspective on State Behaviour A Case Study of Estonia's
Counterterrorism Polides, 61 EUR.-AsIA STUD. 483 (2009).
76. Id. at 486.
77. C. Cora True-Frost, The Security Council and Norm Consumpt*ion, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
115, 138 (2007).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing as examples S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) (women,
peace, and security); S.C. Res. 1261, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 30, 1999) (children in
armed conflict)).
80. Id. at 174.
81. See THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS
(Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996); MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1996); Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Oranizations, 53 INT'L ORG. 699, 713 (1999); Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter?
Retvisiting the 'Failure" of Internaionaism, 51 INT'L ORG. 31 (1997).
82. Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 81.
83. See id ("Mo overlook how state power and organizational missionaries work in tandem and
the ways in which 10 officials channel and shape states' exercise of power is to disregard a
fundamental feature of value diffusion.").
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Although the P5 have certainly promoted "good" norms,84 they have
also circumvented international human rights obligations.85 Other states,
mimicking this negative behavior, often view themselves as legitimized in
doing so since they are merely following the power elite's actions. This
theory has previously been observed with a limited scope,86 but this
Commentary will discuss and demonstrate on a more global scale how
these counterterrorism policies and subsequent restrictions of human
rights are attributable to the theory of "negative" norm diffusion.
D. Negative Norm Diffusion - The Paradigm Shift
In the paradigm shift of post-9/11 counterterrorism enforcement, the
norms that are spreading are ones that impact rights in a negative way, i.e.,
restricting freedom of expression and assembly, denying due process
rights, or normalizing the use of torture. If restriction of rights due to
counterterrorism policies has indeed been diffused as a norm, the question
becomes whether the restriction of rights rather than their promotion
represents a shift in the global trend of norm diffusion and whether the
P5 are responsible for this trend.
1. Theory of Negative Norm Diffusion
Although much has been written on the theory behind how norms are
diffused,87 it is important to note that the literature focuses mainly on
positive norms such as international development8 8 or decolonization.8
9
There is a distinct lack of studies in the area of negative norm diffusion,
generally. A study of the Challenger explosion proposed the idea of
"normalization of deviance," where those working in the space program
84. See, e.g., True-Frost, supra note 77, at 146-68 (evaluating the protection of women and human
security issues).
85. See infra Part III.A. (discussing P5 state practice).
86. See, e.g., Roach, Sources and Trends, supra note 73, at 227 ("It is possible to focus on only a few
sources [of antiterrorism laws], in part because there has been a faddish aspect to post 9/11
antiterrorism laws, with a number of countries following trends established by a small number of
influential international and domestic instruments. In some instances, the directions set by influential
sources of anti-terrorism law already seem dated even though it has been only five years since the
new wave of anti-terrorism laws was launched."); Kent Roach, The Post-9/11 Migration of Britain's
Terrorism Aa 2000, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 374 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Roach, The Post-9/ 11 Migration].
87. See, e.g., Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread WIhose Norms Matter? Norm LocakiZation and
Institutional Change in Asian Regional'sm, 58 INT'L ORG. 239 (2004); Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note
38; Gilardi, supra note 39.
88. See, e.g., Susan Park, Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations: A Case Study of the World
Bank, 8 J. INT'L REL. & DEV. 111 (2005).
89. Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 81, at 713 ("The UN Charter announced an intent to
universalize sovereignty as a constitutive principle of the society of states at a time when over half the
globe was under some kind of colonial rule .... ').
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began to accept certain deviations as standard practice.90 Over time, the
deviation becomes the norm and not the exception.91
Applying a similar theory, scholars have recently explored the theory of
norm regression in several other areas of law, including counterterrorism
and human rights.92 It is possible for norms to disappear since the premise
of their existence is that states internalize and promulgate a given norm.
Once a state no longer views the norm as binding, priorities shift, and it
may violate the norm in question.93 However, under this theory, norms still
remain valid regardless of whether or not there is compliance.
94
Nonetheless, a violation can trigger a "non-compliance cascade,"
ultimately resulting in the loss of that norm's prescriptive force.95 This
non-compliance cascade is, in fact, norm diffusion, with the new norm of
non-compliance taking over. Yet, norm regression does not truly address
the how or why a state feels compelled to prioritize security or that it can
violate human rights in the name of security.
In a recent article, Andrew Guzman and Katerina Linos introduce a
new theory of "human rights backsliding."96 This theory focuses mainly
on the issues that arise from setting a minimum standard of protection in
international human rights law. In doing so, states in which there is a high
protection for human rights feel justified in lowering that standard to meet
the new international standard.97 As such, the state "backslides" in the
protection offered.98 Although this theory could provide an alternative
90. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY,
CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 119-52 (1996) (highlighting several key areas in space shuttle
mechanics where the expansion of the acceptable risk led to norm deviation and, as a result, the
Challenger explosion); see also Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 81, at 721-22.
91. Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 81, at 721-22.
92. See, e.g., David W. Bowker, Unuise Counsel- The War on Terrorism and the Criminal Mistreatment of
Detainees in U.S. Custody, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 194 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006);
Rosemary Foot, Torture: The Struggle over a Peremptory Norm in a Counter-Terrorist Era, 20 INT'L REL. 131
(2006); Karen J. Greenberg, Introduction: The Rule of Law Finds Its Golem: Judicial Torture Then and Now, in
THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra, at 5; Ryder McKeown, Norm Regress: US Revisionism and
the Slow Death of the Torture Norm, 23 INT'L REL. 5 (2009); Franqoise Sironi & Raphalle Branche,
Torture and the Borders of Humanity, 54 INT'L SOC. Sci. J. 539 (2002).
93. See Diana Panke & Ulrich Petersohn, Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes, 18 EUR. J.
INT'L REL. 719, 734 (2011) ("[Ihe necessary condition for the degeneration of norms is that some
actors experience a mismatch between their preferences, beliefs or identities, on the one hand, and an
international norm, on the other hand, and therefore develop an interest in violating a norm.").
94. Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International OrganiZation: A State of the Art on an
Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753, 768 (1986) ("[N]either the violation of norms, nor, in some
special circumstance, even their [formal] 'nonexistence,' necessarily refutes their validity.").
95. See Panke & Petersohn, supra note 93.
96. Andrew T. Guzman & Katerina Linos, Human Rights Backsliding, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 603 (2014).
97. Id. at 608 ("[J]ust as international norms can lead to the expansion of rights in low-performing
countries, a relatively low international standard can arm opponents of the expansion with a neutral,
external benchmark and strengthen the persuasiveness of their arguments.').
98. Id. at 603 ("Norms capable of generating improved behavior in poorly performing states
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argument as to why human rights protection has decreased since 9/11,
there is no indication that an international minimum standard exists for
the protection of human rights while countering terrorism. To this point,
Kim Lane Scheppele, in her article exploring whether there is an
international standardization of counterterrorism law and policy, makes
the argument that since the "new global security mandates are not truly
coordinated in the way that they deal with terrorism, the international
standardization of national security law has so far failed to produce the
seamless web of legal interdiction that the Security Council aimed
to achieve."99
Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg demonstrate empirically in their
recent article, Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional
Constraints, that there has been a restriction of rights in the name of
security.0 0° Those states with strong judicial review experienced the
phenomenon less acutely than other states.'0' Through their study of 150
states, Goderis and Versteeg provide evidentiary proof that there has been
a decline in rights protection since 9/11, but they do not spend much time
discussing or comparing the laws of different states to identify similarities.
European scholars Regina Heller, Martin Kahl, and Daniela Pisoui
theorize that the more that states gravitate toward a "bad norm" in their
fight against terrorism, the more the practice is allowed to continue and
the more the practice becomes institutionalized.10 2 Permitting a practice to
continue in one state makes it more likely that another state adopts the
norm through the mode of learning. And in turn, the more states that
adopt this norm, the more likely it is to become diffused internationally
through emulation or learning.
sometimes also exert a downward pull on high-performing states. This downward pull leads to what
we term 'human rights backsliding'- a tendency for high-performing states to weaken their
domestic human rights regimes relative to prior behavior or relative to what they would otherwise
have done.').
99. Kim Lane Scheppele, The International StandardiZation of National Securiy Law, 4 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 437, 452 (2010).
100. Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Human Rigbts Violations After 9/11 and the Role of
Constitutional Constraints, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2012) ("This paper empirically investigates the
effect of the post-9 /11 terror threat on human rights ... [and] find[s] strong evidence of a systematic
increase in rights violations in the United States and its ally countries after 9/l1 .").
101. Id. ("When testing the importance of checks and balances, we find that this increase is
significandy smaller in countries with independent judicial review (countermajoritarian checks) .... ").
102. Regina Heller et al., The Dark Side' of Normative Argumentation - The Care of Counterteriism
Pohkg, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 278, 282 (2012) ("In the long run, altering normative
expectations may set in motion a negative spiral of normative change, a setback with respect to the
international human rights regime.").
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2. Negative Norm Diffusion, Counterterrorism Measures, and Human Rights
Although Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink note that "there are
no bad norms from the vantage point of those who promote the
norm,"103 the restriction of rights can be viewed as an objectively "bad"
norm - e.g., a government coup where democratic elections are ignored,
lack of religious freedom, restriction of the press - since it would
contradict the very purpose of the United Nations and the subsequent
treaty bodies protecting human rights.104
This question of human rights norm erosion through counterterrorism
norm diffusion, has not, until recently, been explored. Yet,
counterterrorism measures can and do bring about the norm erosion of
civil and political rights.105 In order to validate a state's decisions, it is
necessary to examine whether there is a recurring justification for acts that
infringe upon rights. If that justification is terrorism prevention, over time
these restrictions of rights become more and more legitimate. As they are
legitimized, other states begin to use these actions as justifications for their
own actions, learning and emulating behavior.
Heller and her co-authors primarily focus on the United States' actions
and its violations of human rights for the sake of security.106 There is brief
mention of another P5 member, Russia, but not to the same repetitive
consistency as the United States.107 This theoretical approach may place
too much emphasis upon one state's actions in the diffusion of a
negative norm.
In Kent Roach's book, The 9/11 Effect: Comparaive Counter-Terrorism, he
examines the responses to 9/11 by the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada to those of Egypt, Syria, Israel,
Singapore, and Indonesia.l08 He also focuses on the actions of the UN
Security Council and the United Nations, as a whole.10 9 Although his book
is a useful contribution to the literature on the subject of comparative
103. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 38, at 892.
104. See U.N. Charter pmbl. ("We the peoples of the United Nations determined.., to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women and of nations large and small ... have resolved to combine our efforts to
accomplish these aims.").
105. Heller et al., supra note 102; see also Godeis & Versteeg, supra note 100 (Proving empirically,
before other scholars, that there has been a restriction of rights in favor of security).
106. See, e.g., Heller et al., supra note 102, at 287-88, 294-97, 298-99 (discussing, inter alia, the
Patriot Act justification, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, the Torture Memos, and the CIA Terrorist
Surveillance Program).
107. See, e.g., id. at 279, 288 (highlighting that in Russia the "right to security" is often framed as
the "right to life").
108. KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM (2011) (exploring
these states and their practices throughout the book, with specific chapters or parts of chapters
devoted to each state).
109. Id. at 21-76 (focusing in Chapter 2 primarily on the UN response to terrorism since 9/11).
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counterterrorism and human rights, it falls short of providing a global
view. For example, he finds that Singapore's United Nations (Anti-
Terrorism Measures) Regulations,110 Indonesia's Draft Law Concerning the
Eradication of Terrorism,"' and Australia's Anti-Terrorism Act [No. 2]
2005112 all draw inspiration from the United Kingdom. 13 In a separate
publication, but in the same vein, Roach discusses the further exportation
of the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000.114 While such studies are useful to
provide evidence of the norm diffusion of counterterrorism laws and
human rights restrictions, his works do not account for the French,
Russian, and Chinese role in post-9/1 1 counterterrorism policies.
In 2003, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a working paper on a
comparative study of counterterrorism measures and human rights in ten
different states, which included the P5 minus France. Its study yields
findings similar to both Heller et al.'s and Roach's studies, and HRW
highlights the United States' support for various states' policies and laws.
For example, the counterterrorism efforts in Georgia were supported by
the United States, including by stationing sixty U.S. military personnel in
the country to train the local security forces.115 The report, particularly
related to Georgia, focuses primarily on the United States' influence on
counterterrorism. The report fails to mention or make the link, however,
that in Georgia's next-door neighbor, Russia, suspected terrorists are
known to "disappear,"' 1 6 suggesting that human rights-compromising
influences may not be limited solely to the United States,
Although the United States and the United Kingdom clearly act as
norm diffusers, a fuller account of P5 practice must be assessed in order
to fully appreciate their roles, especially since all five states enabled the
110. United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations, G.N. No. S 561/2001 (an. 31,
2003) (Sing.).
111. See ROACH, supra note 108, at 146 (describing the draft bill and its later withdrawal).
112. Anti-TerrorismAa (No. 2) 2005 (Cth) (Austl.).
113. ROACH, supra note 108, at 137 ("In 2002, [Singapore's] regulation was replaced by legislation
that contained a definition of terrorist activity based in part on the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act,
2000, and the [Internal Security Act]."); id. at 146-47 (noting that the Indonesian draft law's "broad
definition of terrorism, like many post-9/11 antiterrorism laws, was influenced by the United
Kingdom's Terrorism Act, 2000, which similarly defined terrorism to include all forms of politically
(and religiously) motivated property damage and to include threats of actions'); id. at 339
("Australian federal law did not authorize either preventive detention or control orders for terrorist
suspects until the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) in late 2005. These amendments were a
response to the London bombings of July 2005 .... "); see also ANDREW LYNCH & GEORGE
WILLIAMS, WHAT PRICE SECURITY?: TAKING STOCK OF AUSTRALIA'S ANTI-TERROR
LAWS 55-56 (2006).
114. Roach, The Post-9/ 11 Migration, supra note 86 (discussing the diffusion of the U.K law to
both Hong Kong and South Africa).
115. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 13-14.
116. Id. at 18-19; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORSE THAN A WAR: "DISAPPEARANCES"
IN CHECHNYA - A , CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 7 (2005), availabk at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/chechnya3O5/chechnyaO305.pdf.
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passage of resolutions that can and are used to justify the restriction of
human rights in the name of security.
The power of coercion in norm diffusion is a strong factor that has yet
to be properly examined globally. Although Roach highlights the binding
nature of UNSCR 1373, Heller et al. fail to address this facet of norm
diffusion properly in their theory. Therefore, the coercive effects of the
Security Council's actions must be explored in greater depth and detail to
appreciate how there has been a shift in the type of norms diffused in
this area.
Although Heller and her co-authors present a potential theoretical
framework for the theory of negative norm diffusion, relevant global data
is needed to fully support their theory. The only way in which to determine
whether there has been norm erosion or diffusion is through empirical
research, something they themselves admit) 17 Their article and the other
comparative works in the area of counterterrorism and human rights are
merely starting points from which to frame the empirical research on
negative norm diffusion.
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: FINDING EVIDENCE OF
NEGATIVE NORM DIFFUSION
The basis for this research framework is to look at counterterrorism
laws and their implementation on a global scale in order to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to constitute a global trend toward the
restriction of human rights in the name of security. As mentioned
previously, case studies on particular areas and regions have been
completed, but these never assert that the root of the problem lies with
the P5 states.
Despite the fact that, for many years during the Cold War, action by the
Security Council was essentially blocked, the Council in the past twenty
years has been much more active, and members have been willing to work
together on various issues.118 During the years leading up to the attacks of
9/11, the Council took steps to combat the global spread of terrorism,
with a particular focus on Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
the financing of terrorism.1 19 As this Commentary discusses, further
117. Heller et al., supra note 102, at 283 ("Whether processes of norm contestation lead to the
erosion or strengthening of a given norm is an empirical question and cannot be decided on purely
conceptual grounds." (emphasis omitted)).
118. See, e.g., True-Frost, supra note 77, at 191 (noting that the number of TIPS resolutions has
increased exponentially in the years following the end of the Cold War).
119. See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (concerning Afghanistan); S.C.
Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999) (condemning terrorism and requesting that states
implement anti-terrorism conventions); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999)
(demanding that Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden and establishing sanctions list).
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measures were taken again after 9/11 by the Council, asserting its role in
maintaining international peace and security.
Other than the P5, the remaining seats of the Council are filled
according to region and are elected every two years.120 This is important to
note since the only consistent members of the Council since UNSCR 1373
was passed in 2001 to present are the P5. As such, the influence of the P5
within the Council itself is self-evident.
The role of the P5 will be examined in relation to their drafting
influence on UNSCR 1373 and in the promotion of their own domestic
legislation. This will demonstrate that, for the PS, the restriction of rights
in favor of security was the only effective means to act concerning the
terrorist threat and, given their status, it was within their power to control
and influence global policy.
Using the UN Office for Drug and Crime Terrorism Legislation
Database, this Commentary conducts a high-level overview of
counterterrorism legislation in order to determine how much of an
influence the P5 have had on how other states, with varying human rights
records, have acted in their counterterrorism laws, policies, and practices.
The overview presented focuses on states where there have been major
rights abuses that can be linked to one of the P5 states, whether by direct
or indirect influence. It explores where states' counterterrorism policies
look similar, if not identical, to those of the P5 and then observes whether
these states have violated human tights obligations in a similar way.
The study then considers what states say they are doing, since it is often
difficult to understand why a state acts a certain way. For example, the
Indian government "actually referr[ed] to the [recently enacted] American
and British [antiterrorism] statutes" in drafting and swiftly passing its own
counterterrorism law, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, in October
2001.121 In 2002, "Eritrea's Ambassador to the United States justified his
government's arrest of journalists by claiming that detention without
charge was consistent with the practices of democratic countries,"
including the United States.122 Such examples provide evidence that a
norm is diffusing. The various modes of diffusion are explored in relation
to these states' behavior to fully appreciate how the human rights norm
has regressed.
This study also explores the counterterrorism measures of states that
joined the United Nations after UNSCR 1373 was passed. In doing so, a
120. U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 2.
121. IARK SIDEL, MORE SECURE, LESS FREE?: ANTITERRORISM POLICY & CIVIL LIBERTIES
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 163 (2004).
122. Opportunism in the Face of Tragedy: Repression in the Name of Anfi-Termrism, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/septemberl 1/opportunismwatch.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2015).
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truer picture of norm diffusion may become available. Since those states
that are already a part of the United Nations are automatically bound by
Security Council resolutions, the true test is whether or not those states
that are not a part of the United Nations or became member states after
UNSCR 1373 still find themselves swayed by the norm that
counterterrorism may come at the expense of human rights. In doing so,
the intent is to demonstrate that restricting rights in favor of security has
become the new standard operating procedure due to the influence of
the P5.
In sum, the research framework consists of examining P5 state
behavior, both individually and as the Security Council, and considering
the extent to which P5 behavior has influenced both UN member and
non-member states.
III. FINDINGS: NEGATIVE NORM DIFFUSION, COUNTERTERRORISM, &
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The P5 as Individual Norm Entrepreneurs
While a collective unit in the Security Council, these five states are also
individual states, each with unique security concerns. Counterterrorism
measures within each state vary depending on the state's own definition of
terrorism. Regardless of the definition, all five have statutes on the books
that allow for them to take action to suppress the threat and spread of
terrorism. Through the application of these laws, the P5 have often opted
in favor of security over human rights. The following rights - freedom of
speech, freedom from arbitrary detention, and the prohibition of
torture - have been deemed less important, argued around, or ignored by
the P5 in both the construction and application of counterterrorism
laws.
123
1. Freedom of Speech
a. United States
Freedom of speech is at the foundation of the American Constitution,
memorialized in its First Amendment.124 Protected speech takes various
forms, from wearing armbands125 to hate speech.'26 The latter allowance is
123. The examples listed are not meant to be exhaustive of either the counterterrorism laws in
force or the instances of human rights violations. They are used to show examples of how each of
the P5 states has prioritized security over human rights and, thus, influenced other states.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press....").
125. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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where the American view on this freedom becomes exceptional and is
much less restrictive than elsewhere in the world. In fact, the United States
filed a reservation to Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR),127 stating that it would not restrict speech
that was guaranteed by its constitution.128
However, it appears that when terrorism and national security are
involved, the rules governing freedom of speech change. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Projeca,129 the Supreme Court held that providing "expert
advice" to an organization deemed by the United States to be a terrorist
organization was prohibited by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001130 and
that this restriction was not in conflict with the First Amendment. Under
the Act, such advice is considered "material support." The decision has
come under fire from many, including former President Jimmy Carter,
whose non-governmental organization, the Carter Center, works to
promote peace.131 Based on the U.S. government's arguments, the Carter
Center's "election monitoring team could [have been] prosecuted for...
advising Hezbollah during the 2009 Lebanese elections."'132 In contrast, it
is completely legal to sell to states that support terrorist groups items such
as "[c]igarettes, popcorn and chewing gum."133
In application, the ruling in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project has led to
the issuance of at least eight search warrants by the FBI in order to search
for any activities linked to the "material support" of terrorism, in
particular to Hezbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
126. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
127. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 20(2) ("Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.").
128. Human Rights Comm., Reservations, Declarations, Notifications and Objections Relating to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols Thereto: Note
by the Secretary-General, 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994).
129. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
130. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
131. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Rules "Material Support" Law Can
Stand (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rules-
material-support-law-can-stand (attributing to former President Carter the following statement: "We
are disappointed that the Supreme Court has upheld a law that inhibits the work of human rights and
conflict resolution groups. The 'material support law' ... actually threatens our work and the work of
many other peacemaking organizations that must interact directly with groups that have engaged in
violence. The vague language of the law leaves us wondering if we will be prosecuted for our work to
promote peace and freedom." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. David Cole, Op-Ed., Chewing Gum for Terrorists, INT'L N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/opinion/03cole.html?_r=2.
133. Id. ("[T]he Treasury Department, under a provision ostensibly intended for humanitarian
aid, was secretly granting licenses to American businesses to sell billions of dollars[' worth of food
and goods to the very countries we have blockaded for their support of terrorism.'); see also Jo
Becker, U.S. Approved Business with Blackisted Naions, INT'L N.Y. TLMES, Dec. 23, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/world/24sanctions.htrnl?pagewanted=all.
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and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.134 Homes of members
of the Anti-War Committee who had protested the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan and military aid going to Colombia were searched.135 The
Supreme Court ruling opens the door for future, similar investigations, and
it threatens the rights of those who are vocal about beliefs that differ from
governmental policies. As will be discussed further, similar behavior is seen
in more authoritative states. In the name of fighting terrorism, U.S.
constitutional rights to free speech have been re-prioritized for the sake
of security.
b. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's Counter-Terrorism Act 2008,136 amends the
definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 as well as other
counterterrorism legislation and regulations,137 referring to terrorism as
violent or threat of violent acts with the goal of "advancing a political,
religious[,] [racial] or ideological cause."138 This law, in contrast with those
of other Commonwealth countries,139 does not include a caveat that such
speech must be intended to cause death or physical harm and is, therefore,
a blanket prohibition. The lack of precision in the United Kingdom's
definition creates an opportunity for the U.K. government to abuse its
provisions to restrict freedom of speech.
Although the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 amended the majority of the
counterterrorism legislation in United Kingdom, the Terrorist Act 2006
has remained. This act was passed, in part, because of the 2005 London
bombings, and it creates new offenses for terrorism.4 0 In the judgment of
the UN Human Rights Committee, Section 1, the offense of
"encouragement of terrorism," is problematic because it may be triggered
even though the individual "did not intend members of the public to be
134. Cohn Moynihan, F.B.I Searches Aniwar Activists' Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/us/politics/25search.html.
135. Id.
136. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, c. 28 (U.K.).
137. Id. § 75(2); see also Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11 (U.K.); Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act
2001, c. 24 (U.K.); Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 (U.K.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures)
Order 2006, S.I. 2006/2657 (U.K.); Anti-terrorism (Financial and Other Measures)(Overseas
Territories) Order 2002, S.I. 2002/1822 (U.K.); Terrorism (United Nations Measures)(Overseas
Territories) Order 2001, S.I. 2001/3366 (U.K.); Terrorism (United Nations Measures)(sle of Man)
Order 2001, S.I. 2001/3364 (U.K.); Terrorism (United Nations Measures)(Channel Islands) Order
2001, S.I. 2001/3363 (U.K.).
138. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 § 75(1) (adding "racial" to existing list of causes).
139. See, e.g., Securiy Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) (Ausdi.); Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, art. 83.01(1)(b)(ii) (Can.) Note, however, that this provision of the Canadian
legislation includes an option that the act be intended to cause serious disruption to the public or
private essential services, facilities, or systems, even if not intended to cause death or physical harm.
140. Terrorist Act 2006, c. 11 (U.K.).
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directly or indirectly encouraged by [the] statement to commit acts of
terrorism, but where [the] statement was understood by some members of
the public as encouragement o commit such acts."'141 The Committee
found that this could amount to an interference with freedom of
expression and recommended that it be amended so as to not interfere
with this right.142 Despite this concern, the statute, including the
"encouragement of terrorism" provision, remains in place today.
Most recently, the U.K. High Court held that the detention of David
Miranda at Heathrow Airport and the seizure of computer material was
"an indirect interference with press freedom" but could be permitted "by
legitimate and 'very pressing' interests of national security" under Schedule
7 of the Terrorism Act 2000.143 The court of appeal has permitted an
appeal, 144 in part because the U.K. Supreme Court is allowing a case on a
similar Schedule 7 issue to go forward.145 Despite the recent interventions
by the U.K. courts, the application of the law itself is evidence that the
prioritization of security over human rights continues today.
c. France
France, in fact, has a long history of restricting freedom of speech in
the name of security. The Freedom of the Press Act of 1881 crininalizes
the incitement of terrorism and the "glorification"'146 of terrorism.147 The
penalty for such a crime is five years' imprisonment and a fine.148
Incitement can be committed via "speeches, shouts, or threats expressed in
public places or meetings,"'149 but also by written word or drawings,150
141. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 a uly 30, 2008).
142. Id.
143. Miranda v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2014] EWHC (Admin) 255, [73] (Eng.); Alan
Travis et al., David Miranda Detention at Heathrow Airport Was Lawkful, High Court Rules, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 19, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/19/david-miranda-detention-lawful-
court-glenn-greenwald.
144. Owen Bowcott, David Miranda Allowed to Appeal Ruling on Heathrow Detenion, GUARDIAN,
May 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/david-miranda-appeal-high-
court-ruling-detention-heathrow.
145. See Sylvie Beghal v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [2013] EWHC (Admin) 2573, [7] (dealing with
a similar detention at Heathrow airport under Schedule 7 of a woman whose husband was in French
prison on allegations of terrorist offenses).
146. "Glorification" of terrorism is known as l'apologie du tenopisme.
147. Loi 637 du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberth de la presse [Law 637 of July 29, 1881, on the
Freedom of the Press] (Fr.), available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
148. Id. art. 24.
149. Id. art. 23 ("soit par des discours, cris ou menaces profhris dans des lieux ou
rbunions publics").
150. Id. ("soit par des 6crits, imprims, dessins, gravures, peintures, embl~mes, images ou tout
autre support de l'6crit').
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which calls into question freedom of the press. With the Law on the
Guidelines and Programming for the Performance of Internal Security
(LOPPSI 2), enacted March 14, 2011, cyber communications now fall
within the scope of laws governing the freedom of the press.151 This could
potentially have wide implications, as the Internet is a vast, often stateless
place, where it is often unclear what jurisdiction an act is committed in and
which law applies.
In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined the
Freedom of the Press Act of 1881 in light of France's obligation under
the European Convention of Human Rights to protect speech. In Lerqy v.
France,152 a cartoonist was convicted under the Freedom of the Press Act
for inciting and glorifying terrorism by publishing a caricature of the 9/11
attacks. With the caption, "We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it"
underneath, the cartoon was published in a Basque newspaper on
September 13, 2001. The Court held that because of where the cartoon
was published, it could provoke a public reaction that could disrupt public
order.53 The Court held that France was well founded in charging and
fining him, especially considering all the relevant factors. The Court also
emphasized that the relatively small size of the fine was "proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued by the interference."'
54
Empirical evidence indicates that France actually applies this law on a
limited basis. It has only been applied fourteen times since 1994. Eight
such instances fell between September 15 and October 18, 2001, just after
the attacks of 9/11.155 The wording of the law itself, though, is not
without caution, and legal terms are presented vaguely and without
precision. It enables other states to learn from France's legal wording and
use it for their own repressive regimes, as will be discussed below.
151. Loi 2011-267 du 14 mars 2011 d'orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la
securite interieure [Law 2011-267 of March 14, 2011 on the Guidelines and Programming for the
Performance of Internal Security], art. 34, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN(AISE [.0.]
[OFFICIAL GAZEITE OF FRANCE], Mar. 15, 2011, p. 
4 5 82
.
152. Leroy v. France, App. No. 36109/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
153. Id. 45.
154. Comm. of Experts on Terrorism [CODEXTER], Council of Eur., Freedom of Expression and
Apologie A Terrorisme, 30, CODEXTER Doc. No. (2008) 30 (2008), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/WorkingDocuments/2008/CODEXTER%20-200
8_020300/20E0/20Freedom/o20of/o2expression o/20and /20apologie /20du'/o20terrorisme.pdf.
155. Projet de Loi, Renforgant la Pr~vention et la Rbpression du Terrorisme: Etude d'Impact
[Bill, Reinforcing the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism: Impact Study [on the Bill]l, 10, Apr.
2012 ("[L]e dlit d'apologie d'un acre de terrorisme a 6t6 sanctionn6 A 14 reprises depuis [1994] ....
Sur les 14 condamnations recensfes depuis 1994, il s'avere que 8 d'entre elles concernent des fairs
commis entre le 15 septembre et le 18 octobre 2001, soit imm~diatement apres les attentats commis
aux Etats-Unis le 11 septembre 2001.").
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d. Russia
Russia's Federal Law on Mass Media5 6 enables authorities to restrict
journalists from entering zones deemed for "counterterrorism
operations."'5 7 Movement can be even further restricted as "the procedure
for collection of information by journalists in the territory of a
counterterrorism operation shall be defined by the head of the
counterterrorism operation."'158 This prevents journalists from reporting
on counterterrorism operations159 as well as potential breaches of human
rights obligations. Furthermore, the law has been applied to ban journalists
from justifying or endorsing terrorists' actions160  or disseminating
information "containing public incitement to terrorist activity,...
providing public justification of terrorism, or... [distributing] other
extremist materials."'161 Under this definition of terrorist activity, freedom
of speech and the press are severely restricted.
The Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity, passed in July 2002,
introduced a range of severe sanctions for acts that the government
considered to amount to "extremism." The list of acts considered to be
extremist is broad. Many of these acts have been criticized for being ill
defined and limiting the freedom of speech and expression.162
156. Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media, No. 2124-1, Dec. 27, 1991, amended
by Federal Law No. 153, July 27, 2006.
157. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "As IF THEY FELL FROM THE SKY": CONTERINSURGENCY,
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND RAMPANT IMPUNITY IN INGUSHETIA 29 (2008) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, "As IF THEY FELL FROM THE SKY"], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia0608_l .pdf.
158. Id. at 33 (quoting Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media, supra note 156
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
159. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra note 5, at 43; see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, "As IF THEY FELL FROM THE SKY", supra note 157, at 29.
160. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra note 5, at 43.
161. Id. at 44 (citing Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media, supra note 156, art. 4
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AS IF THEY FELL FROM THE
SKY, supra note 157, at 33.
162. See SOVA CTR. FOR INFO. & ANALYSIS, THE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN ANTI-EXTREMIST
LEGISLATION 6-7 (2010), available at
http://www.europar.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009 2014/documents/droi/dv/201/201011/20101129
_3_10sovaen.pdf (providing, in the appendix, examples of poorly defined extremist acts); see also
GABRIELA ECHEVERRIA, TERRORISM, REDRESS, COUNTER-TERRORISM, AND TORTURE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 5, 39-44 (Carla Ferstman ed., 2004),
available at http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/TerrorismReport.pdf; Nabi Abdullaev,
Anti-Extremism Bill Riles Human Rights Acsv'sts, ST. PETERSBURG ThMES, June 7, 2002,
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action id=100&story-id=7348; Fred Weir, Russian Bill Pits Free
Speech Against Naional Securiy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 21, 2002,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0621 /p09sOl -woeu.html.
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e. China
Unlike the rest of the P5, China signed but never ratified the ICCPR1
63
Thus, it is not a state party. Nevertheless, its signature requires, under
international treaty law, that China not defeat the object and purpose of
the treaty prior to ratification.164 Though there is much debate over the
object and purpose of the ICCPR,16s this Commentary assumes the
ICCPR's object and purpose is to protect the civil and political rights
provided for therein.
In 2002, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang was
placed by the Security Council on the Al Qaeda sanctions list pursuant to
UNSCR 1267, despite the fact there were no reports of significant military
activity by the movement.66 This "separatist organization, founded by
Turkic-speaking Uighurs in China's western Xinjiang province," was
allegedly "disseminating peaceful religious and cultural messages" as a
front; Chinese authorities accused ETIM members of being "terrorists
who had simply changed tactics."'167 Prior to 9/11, Xinjiang authorities
contended that the region was stable and that only a small minority
conducted violence in the area.168 However, in a post-9/11 world, these
acts were deemed acts of "international terrorism" by authorities, despite
the lack of intelligence linking the group to Al Qaeda and Osama
bin Laden.
169
Even if members of the ETIM are, in fact, legitimate terrorists with ties
to Al Qaeda, many of the abuses associated with the ETIM and the
Uighur population, in general, are related to freedom of religion.170 If an
163. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard. China, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (China signed
the ICCPR in 1998).
164. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
165. See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY (2d ed., 2005); Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 50/1979, 10.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) ("mhe terms and concepts of the Covenant are independent of any
particular national system of law and of all dictionary definitions. Although the terms of the
Covenant are derived from long traditions within many nations, the Committee must now regard
them as having an autonomous meaning."); Shiyan Sun, The Understanding and Interpretation of the
ICCPR in the Context of China's Possible Raification, 6 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 17, 18 (2007).
166. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra note 5, at 34.
167. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No. 17(2), DEVASTATING BLOWS: RELIGIOUS
REPRESSION OF UIGHURS IN XINJIANG 16 (2005) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
DEVASTATING BLOWS], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf.
168. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEVASTATING BLOWS, supra note 167.
169. Id. at 16-17; see also JAMES MILLWARD, EAST-WEST CR. WASH., POLICY STUDIES 6,
VIOLENT SEPARATISM IN XINJIANG: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2004).
170. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEVASTATING BLOWS, supra note 167, at 57 ("China typically
justifies the detention or defrocking of clerics as a response either to 'illegal activities'- often
activities integral to the free exercise of religion - or to 'religious extremism,' a code term
for terrorism.'.
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imam is not allowed to speak freely regarding his beliefs, then this is also,
by extension, a restraint on his freedom of speech. For example, in the
summer of 1999, an imam gave a public Friday prayer requesting
intervention by Allah to provide jobs to those women who had been
forced into prostitution.'71 The authorities determined this to be a "one-
sided[ ] debate [of] a hot social issue [that] fan[s] feelings of
dissatisfaction," which equates to separatism or terrorism under
Chinese law.172
Despite the fact that much of this legislation and state practice occurred
prior to 9/11, China used the terrorist attacks in the United States to
justify continued violations of human rights for the sake of security.7 3
Furthermore, China took full advantage of 9/11 to argue for the inclusion
of the ETIM on the terrorist sanction list.174
2. Arbitragy Detention
a. United States
The United States has chosen to operate the "War on Terror" 75 under
the war paradigm and not under the domestic, criminal law paradigm, as
most states treat terrorism. Therefore, the law applicable to U.S. detention
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Interim Provisions for Party Disciplinary Actions Against Communist Party
Members and Party Organizations Involved in Violations of Political Discipline in the Struggle
Opposing National Separatism and Safeguarding the Unification of the Motherland (promulgated by
the Discipline Inspection Comm'n of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Chinese Communist
Party Comm., Dec. 14, 2000) art. 8, translated in HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEVASTATING BLOWS,
supra note 167, at 94 ("Persons who stick to the stand of national separatism and openly publish
articles, speeches, declarations, and statements that endanger the unification of the motherland and
national unity shall be expelled from the Party.').
173. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil and Poltical Rights, Including the Question of Torture and
Detention: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment: Mission to China, 65, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.6 (Mar. 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Special Rapporteud ("Under international human rights law,
Governments can only interfere with the expression of political opinions, religious convictions,
moral values or minority views when they constitute incitement to hatred or violence or a direct
threat to national security or public safety in the country. A system of State surveillance of citizens
with non-conformist views and with severe punishments for such "deviant behaviour", such as long-
term prison sentences for vaguely defined crimes, including endangering national security,
undermining the unity of the country, subverting State power, or unlawfully supplying State secrets to
individuals outside the territory, as well as subjecting them to [reeducation through labor], seems to
be incompatible with the core values of a society based upon a culture of human rights and leads to
intimidation, submissiveness, self-censorship and a 'culture of fear' .....
174. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEVASTATING BLOWS, supra note 167, at 17.
175. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001)
(transcript available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/) ("[The] war
on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.').
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practices is international humanitarian law (IHL),176 which is significantly
different than other states' criminal law paradigms. According to IHL
concerning both international and non-international armed conflict, a
party to the conflict may detain anyone deemed to have combatant status
or who is directly participating in hostilities until the end of hostilities or
until they no longer pose a threat.177
Members of Al Qaeda who have been detained are not afforded
Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Conventions, as they are not a
High Contracting Party.78 Furthermore, they do not fulfill the Third
Geneva Convention's requirements to qualify as prisoners of war.179 The
George W Bush Administration deemed these detainees "unlawful enemy
combatants,"'8 0  a title that has been dropped by the Obama
Administration, although the Obama Administration continued to assert
the right to detain those in Guantanamo until the end of hostilities or they
no longer pose a threat.181
176. See Marco Sass6li, The Status of Persons Held in Guantdnamo Under International Humanitarian
Law, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 96 (2004) ("[P]ersons who were arrested in Afghanistan are protected by
IHL of international armed conflicts.... MIhere are two categories of 'protected persons':
combatants, who become prisoners of war protected by the Third Geneva Convention if they fall
into the power of the enemy; and civilians protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention when in
enemy hands."); Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationshi Between Human Rigbts Law Protection and
International Humanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789 (2004).
177. See Chatham House & Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards
for Securio Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 859, 863 (2009),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-876-expert-meeting.pdf ("[P]arties to a
conflict may capture persons deemed to pose a serious security threat and.., such persons may be
interned as long as they continue to pose a threat.").
178. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace
time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.').
179. Id. art. 4 (listing requirements that include having a set command structure, wearing a
recognizable, distinct symbol, carrying arms openly, and conducting all operations according to the
law of armed conflict).
180. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, Secretaries of State
and Defense, Attorney General, and Other Officials 2(d) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_- House/bush memo_20020207_ed.pdf (concluding that
Taliban detainees are "unlawful combatants" and that Al Qaeda detainees are not entitled to
prisoner-of-war protections); Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to
the Secretary of the Navy (a) (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (defining as enemy combatant "an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against he United States or its coalition partners').
181. See Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative
to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009); BENJAMIN WITES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF
DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 16-17 (2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/22%2Oguantanamo/ 2wittes
%20chesney/0122_guantanamo wittesschesney.pdf (describing the minor changes to detention
220 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 55:1
During the Bush Administration individuals were detained outside of
Guantanamo in "black sites."182 This practice is concerning since
individuals that are detained are seemingly "off the books," without proper
records and oversight. The potential for human rights violations in such
situations is high. The Obama Administration has continued operating
black sites with perhaps the same frequency as its predecessor. In the "first
publicly known example," a Somali national linked to Al Qaeda as a
weapons broker was secretly detained onboard a U.S. Navy ship for two
months in 2011.183 Additionally, the CIA, in conjunction with the Somali
National Security Agency (Somali NSA), detains those with suspected links
to al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group.84 AI-Shabaab did not officially
become affiliated with Al Qaeda until 2012.185 Therefore, prior to this
affiliation, the Somalian domestic law, rather than IHL, should have
governed the detention of such individuals. Even though al-Shaabab is
now a part of Al Qaeda, the CIA arguably lacks detention authority. The
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) only authorizes the armed
forces to detain Al Qaeda or "associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."'186 Even if al-
Shaabab is considered a part of Al Qaeda and associated forces, the CIA
arguably is not a lawful combatant in the hostilities against Al Qaeda since
it does not fulfill the requirements under the Third Geneva Convention.187
authority introduced by the Obama Administration).
182. See OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, GLOBALIZING TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION
AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 5, 11, 30-60 (2013), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundatidons.org/sites/default/fles/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf
(describing 136 named detainees, assembled from purportedly credible sources, who "reportedly
were subjected to CIA secret detention and/or extraordinary rendition operations"); Bush Admits to
CIA Secret Prisons, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h/americas/5321606.stm (last updated
Sept. 7, 2006); Joanna Berendt & Nicholas Kulish, Polisb Ex-Official Cbaired uth Aiing CI.A., INT'L
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/europe/pofish-ex-
official-charged-with-aiding-cia.html?_r=0; Amnesty Int'l, 'Rendition" and Secret Detention: A Global
System Of Human Rights Violations: Questions and Answers, Al Index POL 30/003/2006 0an. 2006),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/fibrary/asset/POL30/003/2006/en/dbldbfdl -d468-l1dd-
8743-d3O5bea2b2c7/po1300032006en.pdf.
183. Ken Dilanian, Ten-orism Suspect Secnt Held for Two Months, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/06/nation/la-na-somali-detainee-20110706.
184. Jeremy Scahill, The CIA's Secret Sites in Somaa, NATION, July 12, 2011, available at
http://www.nationinstitute.org/featuredwork/feHows/2283/the-cia's_secretsites-in somalia/?pag
e=entire.
185. AI-Shabaab Joining al .Qaeda, Monitor Group Says, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/aftica/somalia-shabaab-qaeda/ (last updated Feb. 10,
2012) ("Somalia's Al-Shabaab rebel movement has tightened its ties to the al Qaeda terror network,
with its leader pledging loyalty to al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahii.").
186. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat.
1298 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516
(2004) (accepting a materially similar definition of "enemy combatant" for purposes of the case).
187. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 177; see
also Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warare and the Law ofArmed Confhit, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 134
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Therefore, international human rights law should apply to CIA actions,
prohibiting such arbitrary detentions.188
b. United Kingdom
The U.K. counterterrorism law's limits on the duration of detention
without charge have been repeatedly revised. For many years, the detention
limit was seven days, but was subsequently doubled to fourteen days in
2003 and twenty-eight days in 2006.189 Both former Prime Ministers Tony
Blair and Gordon Brown requested, unsuccessfully, extensions of this
period, and one such request was for a ninety-day limit.190 While the
twenty-eight day limit has since been reduced to fourteen days,191 those
suspected of terrorism can be deprived of their liberty in such a fashion
that "still exceeds international standards for being promptly informed of
any criminal charges."'192 The applicable international standards reference
the use of the word "promptly" in the ICCPR, which has been interpreted
by the UN Human Rights Committee to "not exceed a few days."'
193
The U.K. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was enacted, in part, to
respond to the House of Lords ruling in A and others v. Secretay of State for
(2010) ("[O]nly lawful combatants (or privileged belligerents) are permitted to participate in
hostilities. The CIA is a civilian agency and not a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a
liberal reading of Article 4 from [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War],
the CIA would not meet the requirements of lawful belligerency as a militia or volunteer corps
because, while they do report to a responsible chain of command (albeit not always a military chain
of command), as a group they do not wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves, nor do they
carry their arms openly."); Gary Soils, CIA Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/1 /AR2010031103653.html.
188. See Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 292(a), U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/13/42, 13th Sess. (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Council, Promotion and
Protection] ("Secret detention should be explicitly prohibited, along with all other forms of unofficial
detention.'); Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15
March 2006 Entiled "Human Rights Council": Opinions Adopted by the Working Grp. on Arbitrary
Detention, Opinion No. 29/2006 (U.S.), 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/40/Add.1 (Feb. 2, 2007)
(holding that arbitrary detention was not legal).
189. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 (U.K.); Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, sch. 8, § 23 (as amended
by the Terrorism Act 2006) (U.K.); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra
note 5, at 66; Alan Travis, Theresa May Allows 28-Day limit on Detaining Terror Suspects Without Chaqre to
iapse, GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jan/19/28-day-limit-
terror-suspects-lapse.
190. Travis, supra note 189; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra note 5,
at 66.
191. Travis, supra note 189.
192. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra note 5, at 7.
193. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, 179, 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter
Compilation of General Comments] (providing in General Comment 8 the Human Rights
Committee's 1982 comments on Article 9 of ICCPR).
222 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 55:1
the Home Department,194 concerning the detention without trial of the
"Belmarsh 8." Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
(ATCSA), 195 providing for the imposition of control orders over those
suspected of involvement in terrorism, was found to be incompatible with
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obligations.19
6
Section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was declared
incompatible with the Convention's Article 6, which provides for the right
to a fair trial, and called "an affront to justice" by a British high court
judge.197 In a statement issued after this ruling, the Home Office indicated
its decision to continue to operate under the Act because it was in the
interest of national security, effectively disregarding the human rights
implications.198 Later, this judgment was partially reversed in the Court of
Appeal, where it was held that although the victim's Article 5 right to
liberty had been breached, there was no infringement on Article 6 rights.199
Although the Home Office was "concerned about [the decision's] effects
on public safety ... [since] control orders form an essential part of [the]
fight against terrorism,"200 it was unsuccessful in its appeal and the House
194. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) The "Belmarsh 8" were eight detainees at the Belmarsh prison who were held in
indefinite detention without trial under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA
2001). Id.
195. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
196. A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3555/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 172 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int ("The Court reiterates that it has, on a number of occasions, found
internment and preventive detention without charge to be incompatible with the fundamental right
to liberty under Article 5 § 1 ... ."). Control orders are made by the Home Secretary and restrict the
movement of an individual who is suspected of terrorism. Such restrictions include when and where
they travel, with whom they speak, electronic tagging, and tracking of movements. See id.
20, 83, 84.
197. See Re: MB [2006] EWHC (Admin) 1000, [104] (Eng.) ("[Tlhe procedures under section 3 of
the [Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005] relating to the supervision of the court of non-derogating
control orders made by the Secretary of State are incompatible with the respondent's right to a fair
hearing under Article 6.1, and I will make a declaration of incompatibility to that effect....');
Vikram Dodd & Carlene Bailey, Terror Law an Affiont to Jusice - Judge, GUARDIAN, Apr. 12, 2006
(internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/apr/13/humanrights.terrorism; Alan Travis, Reid's Cufew
Orders on Six Terror Supects Are Illegal, Say Judges, GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/02/terrorism.humanrights.
198. Dodd & Bailey, supra note 197 ('The ruling will not limit the operation of the act .... We
will not be revoking either the control order which was the subject of this review, nor any of the
other control orders currently in force on the back of this judgement. [sic] Nor will the judgment
prevent the secretary of state from making control orders on suspected terrorists where he considers
it necessary to do so in the interests of national security in future." (quoting Home Office) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
199. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. IMB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
200. Travis, smpra note 197 (quoting Home Secretary John Reid) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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of Lords held that eighteen-hour curfews are a deprivation of liberty.
20'
The House of Lords relied heavily on ECtHR jurisprudence in its
decision, taking into account the fourteen-hour standard set in
GuzZjardi v. Ita y.
202
The control order system disappeared with the Terrorist Prevention and
Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011.203 The United Kingdom
replaced it with a new "lighter-touch regime" with a two-year limitation,
and now there is no confinement to a particular area.204 It remains to be
seen how effective TPIM will be in protecting against the threat of
terrorism, but it is finally a measure that appears to be in line with human
rights.
c. France
According to France's counterterrorism law, passed in 2006, the police
may request a judicial order in order to hold a suspect for up to six days
without charge and without appearing before a judge.205 However, this law
appears to be in direct contravention of the 1989 ECtHR judgment in
Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, which found that holding a terrorist
suspect for a period longer than four days and six hours was a violation of
Article 5(3) of the Convention.20 6 Although this decision dates back to
1988, Brogan remains the law as a valid interpretation of the obligations
under the European Convention. It is not clear why France would pass
such a law knowing that it is in violation of the country's Convention
obligations, especially when France's previous law and the current ECHR
standard validly permit four days for terrorist suspects.
207
201. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 A.C. 385 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
202. Guzzardi v. Italy, App. No. 7367/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 333 (1981).
203. Terrorist Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, c. 23 (U.K.).
204. Owen Bowcott, UK Terror Suspects Sent into Internal Exile Under Control Orders, GUARDIAN,
Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/mar/26/terror-suspects-exile-control-
orders.
205. Loi 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative a la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions
diverses relatives i la stcurit6 et aux contr6les frontaliers [Law 2006-64 of 23 January 2006 on the
fight against terrorism and containing various provisions relating to security and border controls],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZEYE OF FRANCE], Jan.
24, 2006, p. 1129 (Fr.), available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr; see also CODEXTER, Information on Other
Activities of the Council of Europe: Parliamentagy Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Respect for Human
Rights in the Fight Against Terrorism, 70, Doc. No. CODEXTER (2007) 14 (2007), available at
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf CODEXTER_2007_14_E.PACE.pdf.
206. Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 62 (1989).
207. See CODEXTER, Information on Other Activi ies of the Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE), Respect for Human Rghts in the Fight Against Terrorism, supra note 205,
70, 71, 81 (describing the prior four-day limit under French law and calling into question the
compatibility of the 2006 change with Brogan).
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d. Russia
Russia is a state party to the ECHR, and, therefore, Article 5 and its
jurisprudence are applicable. As in the United Kingdom and France,
holding a terrorist suspect for a period longer than four days and six hours
is a violation of Article 5(3).208
A recent report issued by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture
(CPT) found significant violations in the North Caucasus region of
Russia209 - an area which is considered to be one of the "most unstable
regions in the world."210 When the CPT delegation visited facilities in this
area, it noted that authorities continued to hold suspects in detention
longer than the legal limit of ten days.211 For example, in one facility, a
suspect was detained for thirty-seven days, and, in response to a CPT
question, the head of the facility indicated that "in case[s] of persons
charged with terrorist offences, it happens."212
In the Republic of Dagestan and the Chechen Republic, the CPT
received several claims of "unrecorded detentions and detentions in
unlawful locations" for those who were suspected of terrorist offenses
under Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code.213 The delegation noted
in particular the "case of Mr. K, who was allegedly illegally detained...
[at] the Headquarters of the Special Purpose Police Unit (OMON) of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Chechen Republic... between
December 2009 and April 2010."214
e. China
As previously mentioned, China is not a state party to the ICCPR, and
thus it is not required to adhere to the ICCPR's prohibition of arbitrary
208. Brogan, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 62.
209. Eur. Comm. for the Prevention of Torture & Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment [CPT], Council of Eur., Report to the Russian Government on the Visit to the North Caucasian
Region of the Russian Federation Carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 April to 6 May 2011, Doc. No. CPT/Inf (2013) 1
(2013), available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/rus/2013-01-inf-eng.pdf.
210. Ariel Cohen, Anti-Terrorism Operation in North Caucasus Exoses Russia's Vulnerabili es, DAILY
SIGNAL (Oct. 23, 2012), http://dalysignal.com/2012/10/23/anti-terrorism-operation-in-north-
caucasus-exposes-russias-vulnerabilities/.
211. CPT, supra note 209, 41.
212. Id. (quoting a prison official) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id. 23 (including charges under Articles 205, 208, 209, and 222); see also Mairbek
Vatchagaev, Oftldaly Sanctioned Kidnappings Alienate the Dagestani Public, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
Gamestown Found., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 4, 2012,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx-ttnews%5Bttnews%5D=39926&cHash=09
8l5e4el7blf6fe7ac7ccffee57d7#.VLa8RmByM9; Ugolovnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [UK
RF] [Criminal Code] art. 205 (Russ.) (defining terrorist crimes).
214. CPT, supra note 209, 23.
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detention.215 Article 73 of China's Criminal Procedure Law was amended
in 2012 to allow authorities to keep "suspects in detention for up to six
months at a location determined by the police in cases involving terrorism,
state security, or serious instances of corruption."21 6 This new law is
arguably an infringement on the freedom from arbitrary detention, with
the high potential for other abuses such as torture and other ill treatment.
As demonstrated in the discussion of China's limitations on speech,
217
even instances of expression of a religion can be considered terrorism in
China. Following a protest in July 2009 in Urumqi, 1,434 Uighurs were
detained, and a stern statement issued by Chinese officials indicated their
desire to quash any type of uprising.218 The numbers of detainees rose to
approximately 4,000, although reports left it unclear whether that total
included only those then in detention or, alternatively, all of those who had
been detained and subsequently released.219 One account detailed a raid
that occurred on July 6 involving police sweeps, mass arrests, and enforced
disappearances,220 noting that these operations continued throughout the
month of July.221 Based on witness reports and evidence surrounding the
arrests and enforced disappearances, these actions arguably violated both
Chinese and international law.22 2 Enforced disappearances such as these
are often linked with arbitrary arrest and detention,223 reinforcing the
215. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 9.
216. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, supra note 5, at 74 (citing China
Criminal Procedure Law art. 73, as amended Mar. 14, 2012); see also China: Don't LegaliZe Secret Detention,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/01/chna-don-t-legalize-
secret-detention.
217. See discussion supra Part IH-A.I.e (discussing the Uighur population of China).
218. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "1WE ARE AFRAID TO EVEN LOOK FOR THEM": ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCES IN THE WAKE OF XINJIANG'S PROTESTS 18 (2009) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, "WE ARE AFRAID TO EVEN LOOK FOR THEM"], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/xinjiangl OO9web.pdf (noting authorities' statement
that "every suspect, without any exception, will be arrested and punished according to the law to root
out any hidden danger" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Urumqi Police Detain Another 319
People in Riot Probe, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 2, 2009,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009- 08/02/content_11814102.htm.
219. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "WE ARE AFRAID TO EVEN LOOK FOR THEM", supra note 218.
220. Id. at 22-23 ("That day, a large group of armed police arrived to our neighborhood and took
many Uighur men away. They went after every young man they could catch - those who lived there,
and those who just happened to be there. I saw how they were taken away - the police loaded a full
bus of these young men." (quoting Human Rights Watch interview) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
221. Id. at 22.
222. See id. at 24 ("mTlhe security forces did not introduce themselves and did not explain the
reasons for arrest, and failed to inform the families of the location where the detainees [had] been
taken." (quoting Human Rights Watch interview) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223. Id. at 34; see also Comm'n on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Civil and Political Rights, Including
Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Executions, Rep. Submitted by Independent Expert
Charged with Examining the Existing International Criminal and Human Rights Framework for the
Protection of Persons from Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of
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concern that the updated Criminal Procedure Law legitimizes secret
detention centers in China.
3. Torture
a. United States
For the United States, one only need recall the time of "enhanced
interrogation techniques" to be reminded of the Executive Branch's
preference for security over human rights. The "Torture Memos" 224 not
only argued for not applying detainee status to those held in Guantanamo,
but justified interrogation techniques which probably violate the ICCPR.22s
For example, Guantanamo detainee Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded at
least eighty-three times within one month alone.226 Additionally, twenty-
hour interrogations and "hooding" during transportation and questioning
were allowed as long as their use satisfied an "important
government objective."227
These early memos justified torture by exploiting the loopholes of the
relevant statute, Section 2340, rather than by focusing on the acts in
question. In one such memo, Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, focuses on the "specific intent" of Section 2340,
arguing that the statute requires there to be a "specific intent to inflict
severe pain" and that "such pain must be the. . . precise objective."228 He
distinguishes this specific intent from "general intent," where an individual
Commission Resolution 2001/46, 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/71 (Jan. 8,2002).
224. See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to President
George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002) (draft), available at http://texscience.org/reform/torture/gonzales-
bush-25jan02.pdf; Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. (Jan. 11, 2002), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/200201 11 .pdf; Memorandum
from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William
J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002) (draft), available at
http://texscience.org/reform/torture/yoo-delahunty-9jan2.pdf.
225. See Compilation of General Comments, supra note 193, at 200 (discussing in General
Comment 20 the freedom from torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment under ICCPR Article 7).
226. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to John
A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency 37 (May 30, 2005), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/torture archive/docs/Bradbury/o20memo.pdf; see also Shane
Scott, 2 Suspects Waterboarded 266 Times, INT'L N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04 / 21/world/21 detain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
227. Memorandum from Diane E. Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, to
Commander, Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.american-
buddha.com/911.torture101102ussc20.htm (stating that these acts were legal so long as they were
"not done for the purpose of causing harm or with the intent to cause prolonged mental suffering").
228. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, White
House Counsel 3 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf; see
also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000).
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"act[s] knowing that severe pain or suffering was reasonably likely to result
from his actions."229 Taking an additional step and relying upon Supreme
Court decisions, Bybee contends that "even if the defendant knows that
severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not [the]
objective,"230 he has not met the threshold requirement for specific intent.
Therefore, torture has only been committed when the "express
purpose"23 1 of the act is to cause this level of suffering. Although a jury
can determine specific intent through the factual circumstances,232 jury
trials in this context are a rarity, at most. Attorney General Eric Holder
closed the last two open investigations related to allegations of torture that
occurred during the Bush Administration.
233
Furthermore, under the Bybee definition, inflicting "pain or suffering"
qualifies as torture only if the results are "severe."2 34 As Section 2340 does
not define "severe," Bybee invokes the dictionary definition of the term,
landing upon the definition that the pain "must be of such a high level of
intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure."235 Instead of
concluding there, he looks to other U.S. Code uses of the term whereby
"[s]uch damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the
permanent impairment of a significant body function" to qualify
as torture.
2 36
Evidence has emerged that the CIA carried out "enhanced
interrogation techniques" in secret detention centers.237 Moreover, the
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a report
documenting the treatment of fourteen detainees who were transferred
from one of these secret locations to Guantanamo Bay.238 These detainees
recounted acts that amount to cruel and inhumane treatment and even
torture. Such acts included prolonged stress positions and shackling,
239
sleep deprivation,240 confinement to a box,241 and suffocation by water, i.e.,
229. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, supra note 228, at 3-4.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 4.
233. Glenn Greenwald, Obama's Justice Department Grants Final Immunity to Bush's CLI Torturers,
GUARDIAN, Aug. 31, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/31/obama-
justice-department-immunity-bush-cia-torturer.
234. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, supra note 228, at 5.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 6.
237. See OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 15-19.
238. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value
Detainees" in CIA Custody, at 3 (Feb. 14, 2007), available at
http://assets.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf.
239. Id. at 11.
240. Id. at 15.
241. Id. at 13.
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waterboarding.242 In its report, the ICRC determined that these acts
amounted to torture.24
3
President Barack Obama rescinded the previous executive orders of
President Bush on January 22, 2009.244 However, reports indicate that
torture and other ill treatment continue to be a feature of the fight against
terrorism.245 In the report, Globalizng Torture, the Open Society Justice
Initiative finds that fifty-four states participated in various ways in the U.S.
torture system since 9/11. Among these states are Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Egypt, Germany, Kenya, Macedonia, Morocco, Somalia, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, and Zimbabwe.246
b. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has been complicit in torture by rendering
terrorist suspects to a country where they were likely to be tortured, a
violation of its ECHR obligations, as previously discussed. Linked to the
United States' program of rendition, the United Kingdom allegedly knew
about the CIA's plan to secretly abduct and detain terrorist suspects within
a few days of 9/11.247 Additionally, the U.K. government, at a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting the following month,
"pledged logistics support for the rendition program[ ]," including a
guarantee that flights en route to secret prisons could stop over in Britain
and have free use of British airspace.24
8
Sami al-Saadi, a victim of such a program, claims that the United
Kingdom had arranged his extraordinary rendition to Libya in 2004.249
According to al-Saadi, British authorities had promised him safe passage
from China to Hong Kong if only he would report first to the British
consulate in Hong Kong.250 However, he was arrested upon arrival in
242. Id. at 10; see also OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 17.
243. Id. at 26.
244. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 Gan. 22, 2009).
245. See, e.g., OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 21 (reporting secret detentions
by U.S. authorities in Afghanistan in 2010 and the poor treatment detainees endured); id. at 7 (finding
that extraordinary rendition continued under the Obama Administration).
246. Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted) (providing the full list); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
247. Richard Norton-Taylor, UK Intelligence Officers Knew of CIA's Rendition Plans Within Days of
9/11, GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2012, http://vww.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/22/briish-cia-
rendition-9-1 1.
248. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Andrew Gilligan, Libya.- M16 ThckedMe into Trap, Claims Torture Victim, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7,
2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ibya/8748437/Libya-
M16-tricked-me-into-trap-claims-torture-victim.html; see also OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra
note 182, at 54; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS: US-LED ABUSE AND
RENDITION OF OPPONENTS TO GADDAR'S LIBYA 9 (2012), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya09l2webwcover-l .pdf.
250. Gilligan, supra note 249.
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Hong Kong and flown to Libya.251 His detention in Libya lasted for six
years, and he allegedly suffered acts that constitute torture and cruel and
degrading treatment under almost any definition.252 When al-Saadi sued
the former head of U.K. counterterrorism for civil damages stemming
from both the rendition and complicity in torture, the government settled
the case without admitting liability.
253
Under the United Kingdom's ECHR obligations, transferring someone
out of the United Kingdom who could be subject to torture or other ill
treatment is, at least under some circumstances, a violation of Article 3 of
the ECHR.254 In order for there to be a breach of Article 3, there must be
"substantial grounds" for believing that there would be a "real risk" of
such treatment.255 Furthermore, in Chahal v. United Kingdom,256 the ECtHR
held that even when an individual is suspected of committing terrorist
acts, the state must not extradite the individual if there are substantial
grounds to believe that the individual will be exposed to torture or other
ill-treatment. Despite this obligation, the U.K. government has not fulfilled
its ECHR obligations in the years following 9/11. Recently, the
government entered into a settlement with six individuals who sued for
damages arising out of the government's alleged complicity in their
transfer to Guantanamo and ill treatment.257 The settlement came after the
Court of Appeal held in May 2010 that all allegations of torture were to be
heard in public, 258  a possibility that clearly concerned the
U.K. government.
By participating in the rendition program and allowing terrorist suspects
to be sent to locations where they would be tortured, the United Kingdom
has vicariously participated in and condoned the use of torture in the
"War on Terror."
251. Id.
252. Id.; see also OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 114 ("[He]... alleges... he
was beaten with a black wooden stick that was just over a foot long, whipped with a rope, slapped,
kicked, punched, and subjected to electric shocks on the neck, chest, and arms.").
253. Richard Norton-Taylor, Government Pays Libyan Dissident's Famiy L2.2m over MI6-Aided
Rendition, GUARDIAN, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/13/libyan-
dissident-mi6-aided-rendition.
254. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int; see also Factsheet, European Court of Human Rights, Expulsions and
Extraditions (uly 2013), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FSExpulsionsExtraditionsENG.pdf.
255. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 69 (1991), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
256. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
257. Government to Compensate Ex-Guantanamo Bay Detainees, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11762636 (last updated Nov. 16, 2010).
258. Id.
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c. France
Despite considering itself the "cradle of human rights and the
birthplace of modern humanitarianism,"259 France's recent record on
torture appears to be far removed, as the country frequently cooperates
with states that practice torture. Additionally, French police have
mistreated those held on suspicion of terrorism.260
Based on the testimonies of thirteen terrorism suspects, corroborated
by police reports, HRW has documented the various treatments
administered to those in French detention.261 In addition to physical abuse,
the individuals were also victims of psychological abuse, which included
threats of physical harm or threats to send the individual to another
country where torture would be almost certain.
262
According to HRW, "torture evidence from third[-party] countries has
been introduced and deemed admissible in French courts," as in the March
2004 conviction of Djamel Beghal.263 He was convicted "based in part on
statements he made under torture and ill-treatment in the United
Arab Emirates."
264
In September and October 2005, two individuals who were allegedly
plotting a terrorist attack in Paris were arrested based on information from
Algeria's Department for Information and Security,265 which has a history
of subjecting those in its custody to torture and ill treatment.266 The
259. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "No QUESTIONS ASKED": INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WITH
COUNTRIES THAT TORTURE 44 (2010) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "No QUESTIONS
ASKED"], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ctO6lOwebwcover.pdf.
260. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE: COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND
PROCEDURES IN FRANCE 65-73 (2008) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING
JUSTICE], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/franceO708webwcover.pdf.
261. Id. at 67 ("[They were] subjected to relentless, oppressive questioning and in some cases
psychological and physical ill-treatment. Interrogations can take place at any time of the day or night,
and there are no rules about the amount of rest a detainee must have between sessions. We heard of
sleep deprivation, disorientation, constant, repetitive questioning, and psychological pressure. A
pattern of extended questioning and sleep deprivation was corroborated by the details in five police
reports . . .
262. Id. at 68 (quoting detained individual as saying that the relevant official "threatened me
saying that I still had two more days to talk since I hadn't yet said much, or else he'd send me as a
'gift package to the Moroccans who have different ways of doing things."' (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. ("[A]n officer told him, 'You're lucky we're in France or I'd put a bullet in your head."').
263. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "No QUESTIONS ASKED", supra note 259, at 51.
264. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "No QUESTIONS ASKED", supra note 259, at 51-52 ("Beghal
credibly asserted he was subjected to harrowing treatment while in UAE custody, including freezing
temperatures, beatings on the soles of his feet, the pulling out of toe nails and teeth, sleep
deprivation, and deafening noises. Under torture, he confessed alleged plans to attack [U.S.] interests
in France.').
265. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREEMPTING JUSTICE, supra note 260, at 35.
266. See Amnesty Int'l, Unrestrained Powers: Torture by Agria's Mitagy Securio, 29-31, Al Index
MDE 28/004/2006 (July 2006) [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l, Unrestrained Powers], available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE28/004/2006/en/OOe4bf65-d456-1 ldd-8743-
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alleged tip came from M'hamed Benyamina, a legal French resident
arrested in Algeria upon France's request.267 The conditions surrounding
his treatment in Algeria are suspect,268 calling into question the accuracy of
the information he provided.
Despite its obligations under the ECHR, France continues to rely on
evidence obtained using torture and other ill-treatment, which, when taken
in its totality, could constitute torture, as part of its fight against terrorism.
d. Russia
President Vladimir Putin has often linked issues in the Caucasus region
to the ongoing international campaign to combat terrorism, allowing him
to shape law and policy based on what others were doing then to fight
terrorism.269 The CPT report indicates that Russian security forces' use of
torture is linked with counterterrorism efforts in the North Caucasus, and
evidence of such practices is still widespread.270 The Committee noted that
"ill-treatment is particularly prevalent in respect of persons suspected of
[terrorism] offences under [Article] 205 . . . of the Criminal Code (CC)."
27 1
The ECtHR, in its judgment in Velkhiyev and Others v. Russia,
27 2
confirmed that Russian security officials in the Republic of Ingushetia
used torture, violated the right to life, and failed to properly conduct an
d305bea2b2c7/mde280042006en.pdf; see also Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, 40th Sess., Apr. 28-May 16, 2008,
10, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DZA/CO/3 (May 26, 2008).
267. Amnesty Int'l, Unrestrained Powers, supra note 266.
268. See id.
269. See, e.g., Igor Torbakov, Moscow Moves to Wage Its Own War Against Terrorism,
EURASIANET.ORG (Sept. 26, 2001, 7:00 PM),
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav92701.shnil; INT'L HELSINKI FED'N
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA AND NORTH AMERICA IN THE AFTERMATH OF
SEPTEMBER 11, at 70 (2003) [hereinafter INT'L HELSINKI FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-
TERRORISM MEASURES] ("By comparing its own campaign in Chechnya with the [U.S.]-led campaign
against Al Qaida and Osama Bin Laden, the Russian government has been able to reduce
significantly [the] international scrutiny of its human rights record in Chechnya.").
270. Valery Dzutsev, Russian Government Allows Coundl of Europe to Pubh'sb Torture Report on the North
Caucasus, NORTH CAUCASUS ANALYSIS Gamestown Found., Wash., D.C.), Jan. 28, 2013,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx-ttnews%5Btt-news%5D=40376&no-cache=l #.VAN9PmS
wKHc ("Even though Russian prisons in general are known for massive breaches of human rights,
when it comes to non-Russians, and especially those that were sentenced for connections to rebel
activities, the authorities' abuses multiply greatly."); see also INT'L HELSINKI FED'N FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES, supra note 269, at 178. For more information on the
situation in Chechnya, see INT'L HELSINKI FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
OSCE REGION: THE BALKANS, THE CAUCASUS, EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA AND NORTH AMERICA
(2002).
271. CPT, supra note 209, 15 & n.4 (noting that Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code deals
with terrorism).
272. Velkhiyev v. Russia, App. No. 34085/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
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investigation into violations of human rights. While it was easy to identify
the individual perpetrators in this particular instance, that is not always the
case in Ingushetia, especially because human rights violations are often
committed by masked law enforcement agents in unmarked vehicles.273
When the perpetrators are unknown, authorities may be unable to provide
a remedy to victims of alleged abuse.274 Furthermore, it is often difficult
for victims to seek recourse for these violations, as they fear being
subjected to similar treatment again.275 Families are often threatened with
torture as well, which further discourages victims from coming forward.276
e. China
China ratified the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1988.277
Article 15 of the CAT requires that states "ensure that any statement
which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be
invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused
of torture as evidence that the statement was made."2 78
Chinese rules of evidence permit evidence resulting from the use of
torture to extract confessions.279 Although a conviction may not be based
on a confession alone, confessions nevertheless are integral to the
investigative process.280 Thus, investigators may extract information using
whatever means are at their disposal, including torture.281
273. Amnesty Int'l, The Circle of Inustice: Securiy Operations and Human Rights Violations in Ingushetia,
18, 43-48, Al Index EUR 46/012/2012 (2012), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/3680ingushetia-cover_ contents-web.pdf
(reporting the cases of Zurab Albogachiev and Zelimkhan Chitigov).
274. See id. at 47 ("At the time of writing, the outcome of Zeimkhan Chitigov's case is still
uncertain. Only one official ... is being prosecuted for the crimes relating to his secret detention,
while other perpetrators have still not been identified.").
275. Id. at 45 ("[A]s with other human rights violations allegedly committed by members of law
enforcement agencies in Ingushetia, cases of secret detention are often difficult to prove for the
victim, and insistence on official investigation involves clear risks for the victims themselves and their
families.'.
276. E.g., id. at 47.
277. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: China, supra note 163.
278. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 15, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
279. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. ofthe Special Rapporteur, supra note 173, 37 ("Article 43 of
the [Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)] stipulates that 'it shall be strictly forbidden to extort confessions
by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means'. However,
the CPL does not explicitly prohibit the use of confessions extracted through torture as evidence
before the courts as required by article 15 of CAT .... Therefore, while such confessions shall not
form the basis for charges and convictions, [a 1999 Supreme People's Court] decision does not
exclude their admissibility in judicial proceedings.").
280. Id.
281. Seeid. 37, 40, 41, 43, 44.
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According to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, eleven
percent of the cases referred to that office dealt with Uighur victims. 28 2
The methods of torture used in China do not differ dramatically from
accounts in the other P5 states, including hooding, submersion in pits of
water or sewage, prolonged exposure to extreme heat or cold, being forced
to maintain uncomfortable positions for long periods of time, and
sleep deprivation.
283
The Uighurs have a history of being subjected to torture and other ill
treatment, especially since their forcible repatriation to China from
neighboring states.284 Accounts include that of Hussein Celil, a Uighur
who acquired Canadian citizenship as a refugee but was coerced into
confession to terrorism charges after China persuaded Uzbekistan to
deport him.285 Similar to Russia in the North Caucasus region, China has
relied upon the international push to counter terrorism since 9/11 as a way
to justify its "long-term cultural, religious, and political repression of
Uighurs both in and outside" of China.
286
Given the above accounts of how the P5 have violated and continue to
restrict human rights in the name of security on an individual state basis, it
is not surprising that when their forces combine in the name of
"international peace and security" in their roles on the Security Council,
that similar counterterrorism measures begin to take shape.
B. The Broad Reach of the UN Securioy Council Coercion Turns to Emulation
and "Smart" Learning
Although UN Security Council Resolutions concerning terrorism did
not begin with 9/11,287 UNSCR 1373 differs from pre-9/11 terrorism
resolutions, as the earlier resolutions merely "singl[ed] out a particular state
282. Id. 42 tbl.1.
283. Id. T 45.




286. SHIRLEY A. KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33001, U.S.-CHINA COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 5 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf; see also Amnesty Int'l, Peopk's Republic of China:
Uighurs Fleeing Persecution as China Wages Its 'War on Terror", Al Index ASA 17/021/2004 (2004),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/021/2004/en/47e9cf33-d5cd-l ldd-
bb24-lfb85fe8faO5/asa170212004en.pdf; UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, PERSECUTION OF
UYGHURS IN THE ERA OF THE "WAR ON TERROR" (2007), available at
http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/PersecutionofUyghursj in theEra of theWar_on_Terror.pdf.
287. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998) (concerning peace and
security for terrorist attacks committed in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania); S.C. Res.
1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998) (concerning the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan);
S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 119; S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 119; S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 119
(concerning Afghanistan).
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for sanctions and only requir[ed] actions from all member states in order
to enforce this narrowly tailored objective."288 UNSCR 1373 mandated
that States incorporate domestic counterterrorism measures, regardless of
the existence of a specific threat, since the "crisis of terrorism...
grant[ed] legitimacy to [such] an extraordinary act of remote
governance."289 This resolution was one of the first TIPS resolutions that
became coercive, and it thereby reflected change in the global approach
to terrorism.
1. UN Security Coundl Resolution 1373 - A Coerdve Move by the Securiy
Coundl
a. Aims of the Resolution to Counter Terrorism
After 9/11, the Security Council took matters into its own hands. The
Council spent a total of five minutes passing UNSCR 1373 in late
September 2001.290 Although we know the United States was a key player
in drafting and passing this resolution, the bulk of the negotiations went
on behind closed doors, and so we may never know precisely which other
states on the Council also played key drafting roles.2 91 However, in a
Security Council meeting on September 12, 2001, the Council already had
indicated the need to construct a resolution that would be global in
reach.292 Presiding over the Security Council, the French President referred
288. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-Constiutional Ideas: The Post-9/ 11 GlobaiZation of
Pubic Law and the International State of Emergeny, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS,
supra note 86, at 347, 355; see also Edward Grodin, "Making the World Safe for Democray": UN Securiy
Council Resolution 1373, the International Imposition of Counterterrorism Poicies, and the Arenas of Powers'
Model, CORNELL POL'Y REV., Fall 2011, http://www.cornellpolicyreview.com/making-the-world-
safe- for-democracy-un-security-council-resolution- 1 373-the-international-imposition-of-
counterterrorism-policies-and-the-arenas-of-power-model/ ("Therefore, these resolutions [1269 and
1368] served more as lofty statements of principle than legal obligations for all UN members, even
though they were not directed at a particular state.").
289. Grodin, supra note 288 (drawing this conclusion about the post-9/11 Security Council in
general, including as it passes resolutions like 1373).
290. Provisional Record of the U.N. Security Council, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4385 (Sept. 28, 2001) (meeting running from 9:55-10:00 PM).
291. RoACH, supra note 108, at 31-32 ("It was drafted behind closed doors in just over 48 hours.
On September 26, 2001, the United States began informal consultations with the four other
permanent members of the Security Council and then circulated a draft resolution the next day. On
September 28, 2001, all 15 members of the Security Council approved of the momentous resolution
in a five-minute evening meeting. No country explained why it voted for the resolution, and no
country outside the 15-state Security Council was consulted.'); Grodin, spra note 288; Stefan
Talmon, The Secri y Counclas World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 175, 184 (2005).
292. Provisional Record of the U.N. Security Council, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001) (quoting the President from France as saying, "All together, we must say
that nothing anywhere can ever justify resort to terrorism. All together, we must take the view that
the monstrous acts committed yesterday are a challenge to the international community as a
whole.... A global strategy is needed. The Security Council is the principal organ entrusted with
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in his opening speech to the need for a "global strategy" to tackle
terrorism, despite the fact that the events of 9/11 took place in the United
States.293 UNSCR 1373 was passed seventeen days later and was binding
on the entirety of the international community.
UNSCR 1373 not only created the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee
(CTC), which monitors the implementation of substantive provisions of
the resolution in all member states, but the resolution mandated that states
take steps to "prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts" by
means of domestically criminalizing such acts.294 This requirement
essentially incorporated various parts of the UN Convention Against the
Financing of Terrorist Acts, "impos[ing] these select obligations on all
states without waiting for states to individually ratify that treaty."295 States
should also "[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or
passive," to terrorists.296 Unfortunately, this is a rather vague requirement
since each state defines terrorism differently and, consequently, has
different ways of dealing with the relevant issues.
Jos6 Alvarez, a former U.S. State Department legal advisor and current
law professor at New York University, noted in his 2003 article, The UN
'War' on Terrorism, that the mere passage of UNSCR 1373 is indicative of
"innovative forms of organizational development."297 The body of
Security Council resolutions on terrorism is evidence of the "on-going
revolution in [the Security Council's] interpretation of what constitutes an
on-going 'threat to the international peace."'298 Prior to 9/11, many states
dealt with terrorism without invoking the Security Council, opting instead
to address the issue domestically.299 For example, Spain dealt with the
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) for almost fifty years without a Security
Council resolution pertaining to the group. Additionally, the Security
Council focused only on sanctions, which were used to discourage terrorist
activity.300 The Security Council's reaction to 9/11 was a game changer for
international peace and security. It should work on this in a spirit of urgency.").
293. Id.
294. S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl., N 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also Counter-
Terrorism Comm., Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)
by Member States, U.N. Doc. S/2011/463 (Sept. 1, 2011).
295. Alvarez, supra note 30, at 241.
296. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 294, 2.
297. Alvarez, supra note 30, at 242.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., William B. Messmer & Carlos Yordan, The Origins of United Naions' Global Counter-
Terrorism System, HISTORIA ACTUAL ONLINE, Spring 2010, at 173, 173, http://historia-
actual.org/Publicaciones/index.php/haol/article/view/475/384 ("While the Security Council
reacted to several terrorist events since its founding, its permanent members did not think of
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. A majority of UN members shared this
opinion, emphasizing that it was a problem that could be best addressed at the national level. Many
states did not ratify the General Assembly's conventions dealing with terrorism.").
300. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 119; DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE LOPEZ, THE
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the Council in many ways, especially since it required states to implement
anti-terrorism legislation domestically, something that it had never required
before. From then on, countering terrorism has been linked with a number
of Chapter VII resolutions and became one of the Security Council's
primary objectives.301
b. Lack of Human Rights Protection
Following 9/11, the Security Council urged states to "redouble their
efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts,"302 but it failed to give
adequate direction on how human rights should be protected while
countering terrorism. The only mention of human rights in Resolution
1373 comes in clause 3(0, when discussing refugee status.303 Additionally,
in 2002, the Counter-Terrorism Committee stated that "[m]onitoring
performance against other international conventions, including human
rights law, is outside the scope of [its] mandate."304 Without proper
guidance from the CTC, UNSCR 1373 actually enabled governments to
"launch ambitious new anti-terrorism programs while allowing them to say
that international law made them do it."305
In order to fill the widening gap between security measures and rights
protections, however, the Security Council has issued more and more
direction on how human rights and counterterrorism should coexist. For
example, UNSCR 1535 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate (CTED), which was required to work closely with
SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S (2000) (noting the efficacy of
sanctions imposed on Libya to encourage Qaddafi to abandon terrorism).
301. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1530, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1530 (Mar. 11,2004) (condemning the 2004 train
bombings in Madrid, urging cooperation among states to pursue justice according to Resolution 1373
obligations, and expressing the Council's "determination to combat all forms of terrorism"); S.C. Res.
1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (focusing in part on preventing non-state actors from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction); S.C. Res. 2082, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2082 (Dec. 17, 2012)
(requiring all states to enforce an asset freeze, a travel ban, and an arms embargo in connection with
any "individual[ ], group[ ], undertaking[ ] [or] entit[y] associated with the Taliban in constituting a
threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan'); S.C. Res. 2133, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2133
(Jan. 27, 2014) (calling upon states to refrain from ransom payments for hostages and from making
political concessions that benefit terrorist organizations in accordance with states' obligations under
UNSCR 1373).
302. S.C. Res. 1368,$ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
303. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 294, 3(o (urging member states to "[t]ake appropriate measures
in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international
standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the
asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts").
304. Protecting Human Rights While Counteing Temroism, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL CoNTER-TERRORISM
COMM., http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2011).
305. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Global Patriot Act, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 2011, available at
http://prospect.org/article/global-patriot-act; see also Olivier, supra note 27, at 401, 414 (cautioning
against the delegation of interpretative powers for UNSCR 1373, which could lead states to invoke
the resolution to avoid their human rights obligations).
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the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on matters where both
bodies' mandates overlapped.306 UNSCR 1624, a 2005 resolution dealing
with incitement of terrorism, calls for states to ensure that the
implementation of the resolution complies with international human
rights standards.307 Of note, the right to freedom of expression is
highlighted in the preamble of the resolution.308 UNSCR 1963, passed in
2010, encourages the CTED itself to develop ways in which human rights
can be protected while countering terrorism.309 Despite the recent work in
this area, however, this may be too little too late given the incorporation of
UNSCR 1373-mandated changes in a number of states.
2. 2011 Global Survey on the Implementation of UNSCR 1373 - Evidence of
Emulation and Learning
In 2011, the Counter-Terrorism Committee compiled and published a
Global Survey of the Implementation of UNSCR 1373,310 which provides
an interesting look at how states have emulated and learned from the P5.
Although the CTC urges all states to comply with international human
rights standards, including the prohibition of torture and enforced
disappearances, it is hard to take this line very seriously. UNSCR 1963
reminded states that human rights obligations and counterterrorism
measures should be complementary.31' Yet, the very states that control and
otherwise influence the resolutions passed by the Security Council
overwhelmingly violate these rights in the name of security.312
The Committee also advised against "vague or overly broad definitions
of terrorist offences" since these definitions "pose a challenge to effective
implementation of resolution 1373.' '313 The CTC noted as well that many
of these statutes permitted states to restrict human rights that are
protected by international treaties.314 As demonstrated above with the
counterterrorism laws in Russia and China, this is a legitimate concern for
the CTC.
The CTC finds the war paradigm prevailing in countries such as the
United States to be gravely concerning for the protection of human rights
306. S.C. Res. 1535, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26,2004).
307. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
308. Id. pmbl. ("Recalling the right to freedom of expression reflected in Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights... [and the ICCPR] ...." (emphasis omitted)).
309. S.C. Res. 1963, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1963 (Dec. 20,2010).
310. Counter-Terrorism Comm., supra note 294.
311. S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 309.
312. See discussion supra Part IlI.A.
313. Counter-Terrorism Comm., supra note 294, at 86.
314. See id. ("Terrorism-related accusations or criminal charges have reportedly been directed at
times against persons for acts that are protected by international human rights law, such as the
exercise of freedom of expression, conscience and assembly.").
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since international humanitarian law applies as the lex speialis instead of
international human rights law.315 The comment appears to be directed at
Israel and the United States, as well as allies of the United States fighting
in Afghanistan. The use of military tribunals for terrorist suspects
continues to pose a threat to human rights as well. 316 This criticism appears
to be too little too late, ten years since the passage of UNSCR 1373. States
acting within the war paradigm have firmly entrenched their policies in
practice, specifically concerning detention.
Significant steps have been taken by the majority of states towards the
development of the legal framework outlined in UNSCR 1373.317
However, there are some regions where more work towards a legal
framework has yet to be done.318 For example, unresolved issues remain
regarding the requirement that "all Member States... bring terrorists to
justice" for their crimes, as this is problematic in conjunction with these
states' domestic criminal procedure.
319
C. The Influence of the P5 on Other States' Counterterrorism Measures - A
Stoy of Coercion, Emulation, and "Smart" Learning
The P5 norm entrepreneurs have left a proverbial trail of breadcrumbs
for other states to follow as they craft and apply their own
counterterrorism laws, learning from their peers. Many states model their
behavior after the P5. They do this for a number of reasons - to gain
favor politically, to obtain development funding, or perhaps to be accepted
into a regional organization. Often, states feel coerced to adopt measures
that compromise human rights due to their perceived inferior position in
the international community. Sometimes a state takes on a policy because it
feels as though it can prioritize security over human rights because
everyone else has implemented a similar policy. Zimbabwe is a perfect
example since President Mugabe invoked the U.S. PATRIOT Act to justify
enacting his own version.3
20
315. See id ("Counter-terrorism measures in some States take place in the context of armed
conflict, raising questions of compliance with international humanitarian law. The use of deadly force
in such situations must respect the principles of distinction and proportionality, and violations should
be subject to accountability. It has been alleged that in some States military forces have committed
summary or extrajudicial killings, in violation of the laws of war and human rights law.").
316. Id.
317. Id. at 71 ("Most States of the Westem European, Eastern European, and Central Asian and
the Caucasus subregions have introduced comprehensive counter-terrorism legislation.").
318. Id. ("In the regions where progress is still required, the degree to which the offences have
been fully codified varies widely and continues to require attention.").
319. Id. at 72 ("[R]esolution 1373 (2001) requires all Member States to bring terrorists to justice.
However, country visits and other activities of the Committee have shown that this requirement
poses a major challenge for States' criminal justice systems.').
320. See, e.g., Clapperton Chakanesta Mavhunga, A Plundering Tiger itb Its Deadly Cubs? The USSR
and China as Weapons in the Engineeing of a 'Zimbabwean Nation," 1945-2009, in ENTANGLED
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Sometimes the reason simply has to do with the state's location in the
world and the state's relationship with allies. For example, Kyrgyzstan is
allied with Russia and China in many respects. The definition of terrorism
in Kyrgyzstan's Penal Code echoes the same definition in the Russian
Criminal Code, and its law combating terrorism resembles the Russian law,
which was adopted a year earlier.
32'
The colonial element also cannot be ignored when investigating the
types of laws and practice here. Often, this can be observed because the
states share similar legal systems as a result of colonialism. Tunisia, for
example, has a law for apologie d terrorisme that mirrors the French law and
similarly contains a definition of terrorism that is too broad to meet
Tunisia's requirements under the ICCPR.322 Similarly, Trinidad and
Tobago, a former British colony, follows the United Kingdom's model for
detention for terrorist charges. Trinidad and Tobago's 2005 law mirrors the
United Kingdom's 2003 modification allowing up to fourteen days of
detention without charge.323 A suspect must be charged within forty-eight
hours under ordinary criminal law in Trinidad and Tobago.324
States' reasons for acting the way they do vary. States can learn a norm
and emulate that norm at the same time. States can be coerced into a
certain behavior, e.g., by favoring arbitrary detention, and yet still emulate,
e.g., by detaining in the same fashion as another state. In other words, the
ways in which norms diffuse are not mutually exclusive. The case studies
provided here are not meant to be exhaustive of every instance of the
GEOGRAPHIES: EMPIRE AND TECHNOPOLITICS IN THE GLOBAL COLD WAR 231, 258 (Gabrielle
Hecht ed., 2011) ("mhe [U.S.] Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act[,] and [President] Bush
implored countries throughout the world to join him in 'a coalition of the willing' against terrorism.
One of the signs of willingness would be to pass a raft of anti-terrorism legislations similar to the
PATRIOT Act. Very well, said the Zimbabwean President [Mugabe]. Zimbabwe's amendments to
the Public Order and Security Act (Chapter [11:17]) on January 22, 2002[] used wording similar to
that of the PATRIOT Act, but Mugabe's terrorists were not AI-Qaeda but... internal [political]
enemies.' ,
321. See Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Counterterrorism and Human Rights: Explaining Differences in
the Scope and Brutality of States' Responses to Terrorism 178 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Purdue University) (on file with ProQuest Information and Learning Company, UMI
Microform 3291087).
322. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Spedal Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Wbile Countering Terrorism: Addendum, Mission to Tunisia, 19, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/51/Add.2 (Dec. 28, 2010); see also Loi 2003-75 du 10 dcembre 2003, relative au soutien
des efforts internationaux de lutte contre le terrorisme et b la repression du blanchiment d'argent
[Law 2003-75 of 10 December 2003, in Support of International Efforts to Combat Terrorism and
Prevent Money Laundering] (Tun.), available at http://www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/index.html.
323. Anti-Terrorism Act, 2005, Act No. 26, art. 23 (Trin. & Tobago).
324. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1976, art. 5; see
also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 4-5 (2012), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186756.pdf ( escribing recent violations of the
country's law against arbitrary detention).
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prioritization of security over human rights. The following case studies are
meant to demonstrate a wider range of counterterrorism laws and their
restriction of rights than has previously been examined in the literature.325
1. Bosnia-HerZegovina - Arbitray Detention
In a report released by HRW, the organization highlighted the case of
Imad Al Husin, who was detained in Bosnia beginning in 2008 as a
suspected terrorist.326 During the entirety of his detention, he was held
without charge. The ECtHR blocked an effort to transfer him to Syria, as
doing so would violate Article 3 of the Convention.327 It is this move that
drives HRW to contend that Bosnia is "learning [the] wrong
counterterrorism lessons" and prioritizes national security over human
rights protection.328 Bosnia has considered both the United States and EU
countries to be models for its policy, as the country desires both NATO
and EU membership.329 This could be labeled as coercion and emulation,
in that Bosnia felt it necessary to model its actions after those of these
states to gain acceptance and also that these actions were the norm. It also
appears that Bosnia's action is an example of diffusion via learning, since
other states, namely the United States, have detained terrorist suspects
indefinitely. Perhaps Bosnia felt secure in importing and implementing
these solutions in its own state.
2. Macedonia - Complity in Torture
Macedonia is an example of how the United States has flexed its muscle
in the 'War on Terror" and influenced a state to breach its human rights
obligations. In the case, EI-Masri v. Macedonia,330 the ECtHR found that El-
Masri, a German citizen suspected of terrorist ties, was not only subjected
to inhumane and degrading treatment, but also unlawful detention,
extraordinary rendition, and enforced disappearance when the Macedonian
government handed him over to CIA agents. In January 2004, El-Masri
was taken to a hotel in Skopje by the Macedonian police and was kept
there for twenty-three days, during which he was subjected to acts, in the
325. The states chosen for this Subpart are not meant to be indicative of the only state practice
available, but rather to provide evidence of the types of ways in which negative norm diffusion has
occurred. Further study in this area remains a priority.
326. Lydia Gall, Bosnia Is Learning Wrong Counterterrorism Lessons, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 16,
2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/16/bosnia-learning-wrong-counterterrorism-lessons.
327. Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 3727/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
328. Gall, supra note 326.
329. Id.
330. EI-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
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presence of Macedonian officials, that amounted to inhuman and
degrading treatment under the European Convention's Article 3.331 He
allegedly came under the custody of U.S. officials and was transferred to
Afghanistan where he was held for four months and subjected to further
acts of torture and inhumane treatment.332 Finally, he was released back to
Germany in May 2004, with the United States admitting much later that he
was wrongly detained.333
By permitting another actor to torture on its soil and then allowing that
person to be detained without charge for twenty days until he was then
transferred to another state for further torture, Macedonia's actions call
into question its commitment to human rights. Unfortunately, Macedonia
did not "submit any arguments providing a basis for an explanation or
justification of the degree of force used."334 Given the amount of
influence and power that the United States, through aid funding, exerts
over smaller, developing states like Macedonia,335 it is no wonder that
Macedonia allowed human rights violations in its territory. This is an
example of coercion, although there is no evidence to suggest that the
United States had to force Macedonia to neglect its obligations. Rather, the
United States' influence and pressure on countries to assist in these types
of violations is well documented.336
331. See id. 203-05.
332. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Macedonian Government Responsible for
Torture, Ill-Treatment and Secret Rendition of a Man Suspected of Terrorist Ties, ECHR 453 (2012).
333. EI-Masri, App. No. 39630/09, 128; Amrit Singh, European Court of Human Rghts Finds
Against CIA Abuse of Khaled El-Masni, GUARDIAN, Dec. 13, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/ 13/european-court-human-rights-cia-
abuse-khaled-elmasri ("In December 2005, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told a press
conference - while then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stood by her side - that the United
States had admitted it had made a mistake. But the [U.S.] government still refused to acknowledge its
shameful conduct in el-Masri's case and waged a successful campaign to prevent other governments
from disclosing the truth."); The CIA in Europe: Secrets Flights Investigation Raises the Veil, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INT'L, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-cia-in-europe-secrets-flights-
investigation-raises-the-veil-a-413279.html ("The CIA denies torturing el-Masri but admits it rounded
up the wrong man.").
334. EI-Masri, App. No. 39630/09, 207.
335. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., USAID IN MACEDONIA 1993-2011: A STORY OF
PARTNERSHIP AND PROGRESS 10 (2011), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/Pdacs595.pdf
(noting that the amount of aid provided by the United States for various projects from 1993-2011
totaled $530 million).
336. See, e.g., OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 93-95; see also Raymond
Bonner, Indonesia Bings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/29/international/asia/29indonesia.html?r=O (documenting one
such instance of U.S. pressure on another country to "detain [a suspected terrorist] while seeking
evidence to support the new charges").
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3. Somalia - Secret Detention Sites
According to recent reports, there exists an "underground prison" in
the headquarters of the Somali National Security Agency, which appears to
be a joint operation between the Somali NSA and the CJA.337 "While the
underground prison is officially run by the Somali NSA, [U.S.] intelligence
personnel pay the salaries of intelligence agents and also directly
interrogate prisoners," reports one journalist.338 Additionally, the Somali
Minister of State for the Presidency, Abdulkadir Moallin Noor, has
confirmed U.S. intelligence collaboration.339  Regional cooperation,
generally, has increased since late 2001, with the establishment of an
American military base in Djibouti 340 and Transitional National
Government military leaders in Somalia delivering terrorist suspects to
American authorities.341 International Crisis Group interviewed individuals
in Somalia who had been wrongly detained, including Abdulmanaf
Abdullah, an Iraqi who moved to Modagishu in November 2001. In
March 2003, Abdullah was assaulted, detained in a secret location, and
interrogated by Somali and American agents for almost a month.342
There is cooperation between Somalia and the United States in these
counterterrorism efforts, and, where there is cooperation, norms will
diffuse via learning and emulation. The continued cooperation between
the two countries suggests that although the Obama Administration has
stated repeatedly that it will protect human rights while countering
terrorism,343 this is perhaps lip service when fighting against Al Qaeda and
other terrorist organizations.344 In fact, although he rebranded the "War on
337. Scahill, supra note 184; see also OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 106-07.
338, Scahill, supra note 184.
339. Id; see also INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT No. 95, COUNTER-TERRORISM IN SOMALIA:
LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS? 9-10 (2005), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Counter-
Terrorism%20in%20Somalia%20Losing% 20Hearts%20and%20Minds.pdf.
340. INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 339, at 9.
341. Id. at 12,
342. Id. at 16-17.
343. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at U.N. Security Council
Summit on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (Sept. 24, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/201 4/09/24/remarks-president-un-security-council-summit-foreign-terrorist- fighters
("[R]especting human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law is not optional -- it is an
essential part of successful counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, history teaches us that the failure to
uphold these rights and freedoms can actually fuel violent extremism."); Warren Richey, Obama Moves
to Overhaul 'War on Terror' Practices, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Pofitics/2009/0122/obama-moves-to-overhaul-war-on-terror-
practices (quoting President Obama as saying that "we are going to [prosecute the struggle against
terrorism] in a manner that is consistent with our values and our ideals").
344. See, e.g., Dilanian, supra note 183 ("Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, in his confirmation
hearings to become CIA director, said in response to questions ... that he believed the [United
States] should find a way to capture and detain militants and hold them someplace other than
Guantanamo."); Craig Whitiock, Renditions Continue Under Obama, Despite Due Process Concerns, WASH.
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Terror,'345 President Obama has continued to operate under the war
paradigm. Although there are legitimate security concerns over al-Shabaab
and its link to Al Qaeda, holding individuals in secret detention sites is
against international human rights law.
346
4. Sweden - Forced Repatriation to Torture
At the request of United States and Egyptian intelligence, asylum
seekers Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed Alzery were denied asylum in
Sweden and were forcibly sent back to Egypt.347 Upon allegations that they
were tortured and mistreated in the Bromma airport in Stockholm348 as
well as in Egypt,349 both the UN Human Rights Committee350 and the
Committee Against Torture (CAT)351 investigated to determine the
veracity of these claims and Sweden's potential responsibility in
this matter.
The Human Rights Committee determined that although Sweden
admitted "there was a real risk of ill-treatment[ ] ... [its] reliance on
diplomatic assurances" was not sufficient to overcome concerns for
mistreatment to "a level consistent with its obligations under Article 7 of
the ICCPR."352 The CAT found similarly that the government of Sweden
"[knew] or should have known... that Egypt resorted to consistent and
POST, Jan. 1, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-01/world/36323571_I obama-
administration-interrogation-drone-strikes ("Renditions are taking on renewed significance because
the administration and Congress have not reached agreement on a consistent legal pathway for
apprehending terrorism suspects overseas and bringing them to justice.").
345. See Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, 'Global War On Ter-or' Is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar.
25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.
346. Somalia acceded to the ICCPR in 1990. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: Somalia, U.N.
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2015). See Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection, supra note 188, at 2
("The legal assessment concludes that secret detention is irreconcilably in violation of international
human rights law, including during states of emergency and armed conflict. Likewise, it is in violation
of international humanitarian law during any form of armed conflict.").
347. Amnesty Int'l, Sweden: The Case of Mohammed El Zari and Ahmed Agi!Za: Violations of
Fundamental Human Rights by Sweden Confirmed, 2-3, Al Index EUR 42/001/2006 (2006) [hereinafter
Amnesty Int'l, Sweden], available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR42/001/2006/en/97edf527-d3d2-11 dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/eur420012006en.pdf; see also OPEN SOC'YJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 182, at 24-
25; Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, United Nations Human Rights Committee Consideration of the 6th
Periodic Report of Sweden: Submission of the International Commission of Jurists, 4-6 (2009),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/enghlsh/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/ICJ-SwedenHRC95.pdf.
348. Amnesty Int'l, Sweden, supra note 347, at 4.
349. Id. at 4-5.
350. Human Rights Comm., Views, Commc'n No. 1416/2005, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Nov. 10, 2006).
351. Comm. Against Torture, Decision, Commc'n No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005) [hereinafter Comm. Against Torture, Decision].
352. Amnesty Int'l, Sweden, supra note 347, at 6.
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widespread use of torture" and, therefore, the forcible removal from
Sweden to such an environment "was in breach of [A]rticle 3 of the
Convention [Against Torture] ."353 It also held that Sweden should not have
allowed U.S. security forces to perform their own security check on
Swedish soil.
354
According to the CAT, the Swedish security police at the airport
"remained passive" and then "lost control," as the 'American security
personnel took charge and were allowed to perform the security check on
their own," which violates Swedish law.355 The degree of United States
involvement in this incident shows the amount of influence that the
United States had over other states in the days immediately following 9/11.
Even those states with a strong stance on protecting human rights were
not beyond influence. It appears that Sweden was either coerced into
remaining passive or emulated the U.S. standard in this particular instance.
The fact that Sweden failed to uphold its obligations under both the CAT
and the ECHR implies a favoring of security over human rights, which
continues to diffuse this norm.
5. Turkey - Restricting Speech and Expression
Turkey has a higher conviction rate for those arrested under its
counterterrorism measures than any other state.356 The 1991 Anti-
Terrorism Law enabled prosecutors and judges to order a temporary
suspension of any newspaper or magazines accused of publishing
"terrorist propaganda."357 This particular provision was later repealed in
July 2012,358 but other infringing laws remain. For example, the Anti-
Terrorism Law is often used to directly connect those who speak on
behalf of or in sympathy with alleged terrorist group to the alleged
terrorists themselves, regardless of whether or not the individuals are
actually a member of the terrorist group.35 9
353. Comm. Against Torture, Decision, supra note 351, 13.4.
354. See id.
355. Id. 12.29, 12.30.
356. See Martha Mendoza, Global Terrrism: 35,000 Worldwide Convicted for Terror Offenses Since
September 11 Attacks, WORLD POST (Sept. 3, 2011, 2:52 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/03/terrorism-convictions-since-sept-11_n_947865.html
(reporting findings of broad survey and describing methods).
357. Wendy Zeldin, Turky; United Nations: Criticism of Ani-Terroism Laws, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servet/lloc-news?disp3_1205403397-text (last updated Nov. 8, 2012);
Ter6rle Mticadele Kanunu [Anti-Terror Law], 1991, No. 3713, art. 6(5) (repealed 2012) (Turk.).
358. Zeldin, supra note 357.
359. OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, TURKEY:
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, GuILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 11 (2012), available at
http://www.ccprcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/OMCTFIDHTurkeyl06.pdf CThe
application of the [Anti-Terrorism Law] mainly targets Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin or those
who express sympathy with the Kurds.").
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Furthermore, in July 2006, Turkey extended the scope of its 1991 Anti-
Terror Law Article 7(2), prohibiting "making propaganda for a terrorist
organization," to cover demonstrators and dissenters in support of the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and authorities cite this provision to
stifle speech supporting the Kurdish liberation movement in Turkey.
360
The amended law has also been used to justify the detention of human
rights lawyers working on issues related to the PKK.361 The application of
this law in such a way mirrors the way in which the P5 have applied
counterterrorism legislation, state practice under the U.S. PATRIOT Act,
Russian Federal Law on Mass Media, and French law against apologie
du terrorisme.
Despite 'its revisions, Turkey still came under fire from the UN Human
Rights Committee in 2012 for using a "vague[ ] . .. definition of a terrorist
act, for "far-reaching restrictions imposed on the right to due process,"
and for the large number of charges brought under the Anti-Terrorism
Law for what should be protected free speech.362 Notwithstanding the
criticism, Turkey has continued to apply these laws to activists and to
restrict rights in the name of security. In January 2013, Turkish police took
fifteen human rights lawyers into custody.363 Eventually nine were charged
with membership in the People's Liberation Party-Front (RPLP) and with
opposing the government.364 As of March 2014, they were still awaiting
trial, with five remaining in pre-trial detention.365 Furthermore, Turkey has
360. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROTESTING AS A TERRORIST OFFENSE: THE ARBITRARY USE
OF TERRORISM LAWS TO PROSECUTE AND INCARCERATE DEMONSTRATORS IN TURKEY 22 (2010)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROTESTING AS A TERRORIST OFFENSE], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey11 Owebwcover.pdf; see also OBSERVATORY
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, supra note 359, at 20 (explaining that
another 2006 amendment, to Article 2, "paved the way for the targeting under the anti-terrorism law
of individuals advocating for the respect of [the] Kurdish minority's rights or denouncing abuses
committed in the framework of the fight against terrorism").
361. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROTESTING AS A TERRORIST OFFENSE, supra note 360;
Turkey: Muhamm Erbgy Released After 1 '570 Days in Pie-Trial Detention, INT'L FED'N FOR HUM. RTS.
(Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.fidh.org/International-Federatin- for-Human-
Rights/europe/turkey/I 5132-turkey-muharrem-erbey-released-after-i -570-days-in-pre-trial-
detention.
362. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Turkey Adopted
by the Committee at Its 106th Session (15 October - 2 November 2012), 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1 (Nov. 13, 2012); see also Zeldin, supra note 357.
363. Marjorie Cohn, The Turkish Spring: Lawyers Rounded Up, JURIST (June 13, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://urist.org/forum/2013/06/marjorie-cohn-turkey-protests.php.
364. Turkey: Nine Human Rights Lawyers Impnsoned, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/22/turkey-nine-human-rights-lawyers-imprisoned; see also
Daniel Mullen, Turkish Court Charges Nine Lawyers Under Ani-Terrorism Law, JURIST (Jan. 22, 2013,
12:17 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/01/turkish-court-charges-nine-lawyers-under-anti-
terrorism-law.php.
365. Turky: Provisional Releases and Continued Juditial Harassment of 47 Lawyers, One Journalist, One
Legal Secretagy and Two Drivers, INT'L FED'N FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.fidh.org/en/europe/turkey/14993-turkey-provisional-release-and-continued-judicial-
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detained and prosecuted more journalists than any other state, in the name
of security.
366
In a way that mirrors the rest of the P5, Turkey's laws have ambiguous
definitions of what qualifies as terrorism. Turkey also restricts the speech
of those deemed as a separatist movement and other individuals or groups
that are critical of the government. Although both Turkey and Russia have
ratified the European Convention of Human Rights, it appears that Turkey
has learned and emulated Russia's restriction of freedom of speech in a
post-9/1 world. Turkey's laws also could be viewed as similar to France's
apologie du terrorisme law since anyone speaking out who sympathizes with a
terrorist group could be seen as promoting terrorism. Based on the
similarities between these laws, Turkey appears to perceive that the P5 laws
are the models for national security.36 7
6. Zimbabwe - Using Anti-Terroism Legislation to Silence Political Opposition
In Zimbabwe, terrorism is vaguely defined, which leaves room for
oppression, as discussed above. According to Zimbabwe's Suppression of
Foreign and International Terrorism Act, a person who "solicits, invites or
encourages moral or material support" to a terrorist organization can be
charged and punished with imprisonment for up to five years.368 This Act,
passed by the Zimbabwean Parliament in 2007, defines terrorists and
terrorist groups as those who wish to overthrow the government "by
unlawful means or usurping [its] functions," anyone who "conduct[s] a
campaign or assist[s] any campaign" in achieving this, or anyone who
"engag[es] in foreign or international terrorist activity."369
harassment-of-47-lawyers (last updated Mar. 20, 2014).
366. Number of Jailed Journalists Sets Global Record, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Dec. 11,
2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.cpj.org/reports/2012/12/imprisoned-joumalists-world-record.php.
367. See, e.g., ipek Demirsu, Britain, Turkey and Trading Human Rigbts for 'Counter-Terrorism;
OPENSECURITY (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ipek-
demirsu/britain-turkey-and-trading-human-rights-for-counter-terrorism (providing a side-by-side
comparative approach to the U.K. and Turkey counterterrorism laws); VERONIQUE DUDOUET,
BERGHOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION & BERGHOF PEACE SUPPORT, POLICY BRIEF 02, ANTI-
TERRORISM LEGISLATION: IMPEDIMENTS TO CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 6 (2011), available at
http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/pubfications/PoficyBrief02.pdf ("The impact
of anti-terrorist legislations in Europe and North America on the course of armed conflicts around
the globe is all the more important as they often provide a source of inspiration for local
governments to adopt similar legal measures in order to legitimise their conflicts with proscribed
actors as part of a globalised fight against terrorism. Such tendencies can be observed for instance in
Colombia, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Uganda, where national counter-terrorism laws are largely
inspired by [U.S.] or EU legislations.").
368. Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Act, Act 5/2007, S 10 (Zim.), available at
http://rbz.co.zw/Website%20materials%2019.08.1 3/3.%2OLegal %2OFramework/4.%2OSuppression
%20of"/o20Foreign/ 20and%201ntemational/ 20Terrorism%2OAct.pdf.
369. Id. § 2.
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The charge of terrorism is often brought against the political
opposition. In December 2008, Jestina Mukoko, a human rights activist
who documented human rights abuses committed by the Mugabe
government, was abducted, held without charge in an undisclosed location,
and beaten before finally being deposited at the police station and charged
with terrorism offenses.370 The charges were later dropped in September
2009 by the Zimbabwe Supreme Court.37 1 In 2010, Roy Bennett, a leader
of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the key opposition
party to President Robert Mugabe, was acquitted of plotting to violently
overthrow the President in 2009.372 Bennett had been arrested on
terrorism charges under Zimbabwe's Public Order and Security Act,
interestingly, on the day in which his new government was to take over.
373
Furthermore, there has been documented violence against other newly
elected MPs and senators.374 Although not charged with terrorism like
Bennett, MP Ian Kay, for example, was charged with "inciting political
violence," and his home was searched for "allegedly taking pictures of a
political nature and sending them outside the country."375 Presumably Kay
was thought to be "causing or furthering an insurrection in Zimbabwe"
under the Public Order and Security Act,376 although the HRW report
does not say as much. The report does document mistreatment by both
the police and the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF), and it indicates that many of the victims interviewed were
currently in hiding, as police sought them for "inciting political
violence."377 These examples show that counterterrorism laws are being
used in Zimbabwe to stifle political opposition and not to counter
terrorism itself.
Evidence suggests that President Mugabe has both learned from and
emulated members of the P5. The wording of President Mugabe's policies
on incitement of political violence and inciting an insurrection closely
370. Affidavit of Jestina Mungarehwa Mukoko (2008), available at
http://graphics8.nymes.com/packages/pdf/world/2009/JM_Affidavit.pdf; see also Barry Bearak,
Court Ends Terrorism Case Against Zimbabwe Activist, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/world/africa/29zimbabwe.htrl.
371. Bearak, supra note 370.
372. Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Court Acquits Mugabe Opponent of Terrotism Charges, INT'L N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/world/africa/1 lzimbabwe.html?_r=0.
373. Id.; PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY ACT, pt. I1, art. 6, Jan. 22, 2002 (Zim.), available at
http://www.kubatana.net/htmi/archive/legisl/020122posab.asp?sector=LEGISL&year=Oamp;rang
e-start=l&rangestart=l #6.
374. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THEY BEAT ME LIKE A DOG": POLITICAL PERSECUTION OF
OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS AND SUPPORTERS IN ZIMBABWE (2008) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, "THEY BEAT ME LIKE A DOG"], available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabweO8O8/zimbabweO808webwcover.pdf.
375. Id. at 14 (quoting police statement) (internal quotation marks omitted).
376. PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY ACT, supra note 373.
377. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THEY BEAT ME LIKE A DOG", supra note 374, at 13-18.
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mirror similar policies in Russia and China, demonstrating key aspects of
both learning and emulation. As previously discussed, President Mugabe
has also taken wording directly from the U.S. PATRIOT Act and applied it
to Zimbabwe's counterterrorism legislation.378  This is evidence of
emulation and even more so learning, since Zimbabwe observed how the
United States has used the PATRIOT Act domestically and tweaked the
application to suit its own aims.
7. Yemen - Coerdon to Arbitrary Detention
The influence of the United States in Yemen is evident, especially as the
United States has been allowed to carry out drone strikes within Yemen.
While this is not necessarily evidence of any of the modes of diffusion, it
is indicative of the nature of the relationship that exists between the two
states.379 This close relationship in the "War on Terror" creates an
opportunity for norms to diffuse, whether via coercion, learning, or
emulation.
In 2002, the Yemeni government acknowledged in an interview with
Amnesty International that the country was violating both its human rights
obligations and domestic law.380 However, officials attributed this lapse in
adherence to the need to 'fight terrorism' and avert the risks of military
action against Yemen by the [United States] in the wake of [September
11]."38 This telling admission marks a clear indicator of the coercion that
resulted in human rights being sacrificed for security, especially when the
threat of U.S. military action loomed.
378. See Mavhunga, spra note 320; PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY ACT, supra note 373.
379. See Amnesty Int'l, Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Securi, 19, Al Index MDE
31/006/2003 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l, Rule of Law Sidelined], available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/ibrary/asset/MDE31/006/2003/en/1201 e721 -d6a7-1 1 dd-ab95-
a13b602c0642/mde310062003en.pdf ("Yemen-[United States] relations bear direct relevance to the
deterioration of the human rights situation in Yemen since the 11 September 2001 events. In the
wake of these events the two countries forged a special military and security cooperation. The impact
of such cooperation on human rights is manifested in the practice of detention, training of Yemen
security forces, and the possible extra-judicial killing of six men in November 2002 ...."); see also
Amnesty lnt'l, Yemen: Cracking Down Under Pressure, Al Index MDE 31/010/2010 (2010) [hereinafter
Amnesty Int'l, Cracki'ng Down], available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/fibrary/asset/MDE31/010/2010/en/da8bd0cc-37ab-4472-80b3-
bcf8a48fc827/mde3lOlO2OlOen.pdf.
380. Amnesty Int'l, Rule of Law Sidelined, supra note 379, at 3; see also id. at 17 ("The Government
of Yemen informed Amnesty International that it had 'no option' but to continue the practice of
detention without charge or trial of those held and to offer them no opportunity of access to lawyers
or the judiciary to challenge the legality of their detention. The authorities argued that the primary
reason for the arrests and detentions was the priority of security, not justice.'); Amnesty Int'l,
Cracking Down, supra note 379, at 6; Lynn Welchman, Rocks, Hard Places and Human Rights: Ani-
Terrorism Law and Poliy in Arab States, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 621, 652-53
(Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
381. Amnesty Int'l, Rule of Law Sidelined, supra note 379, at 3; see also id. at 17, 19-20 (describing
the threat of U.S. military invasion and more evidence of cooperation between the countries).
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This pattern has not changed. In 2011, in response to a phone call from
President Obama, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh revoked his
pardon of Abdulelah Haider Shaye, a journalist who was charged with
being an Al Qaeda operative after reporting on a U.S. attack on an Al
Qaeda training camp.382 Shaye was released from prison in July 2013 after
successor President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi issued a new pardon in
May 2013.383 Furthermore, according to a 2012 Amnesty International
report, alleged Al Qaeda members and supporters held at the Political
Security prison "were reported to have been beaten by guards... after
going on [a] hunger strike to protest against their prolonged detention...
[and] ill treatment."384 These beatings resulted in hospitalization for at least
ten of the detainees,385 raising questions of cruel and inhumane treatment
and whether their continued living conditions amounted to torture.
Yemen's response to the hunger strike parallels the U.S. policy on hunger
strikes in Guantanamo.386 The U.S. influence here remains strong, and
Yemen is learning from its Western allies in the "War on Terror."
D. The Far-Reaching Influence of the P5 on Post-1373 States and Non-Member
States
As previously discussed, UNSCR 1373 had a unique effect on UN
member states, requiring them to implement counterterrorism legislation.
The preceding Subparts dealt with states that were already UN member
states at the time of 9/11 and described how a restriction of rights has
spread globally in favor of national security. In turn, we might ask whether
states that are not UN member states, or states that joined the United
Nations after 9/11, have nevertheless learned from and emulated the P5.
In an effort to complete the analysis of the spread of a
counterterrorism norm that negatively affects human rights, the following
states were chosen on the basis that they either became UN member states
after the passage of 1373 or are not UN members: Switzerland, South
Sudan, Montenegro, and Kosovo. These states are, therefore, out of the
382. Tom McCarthy, Yemeni Journalixt Who Reported US Missile Strike Is Released from Jail,
GUARDIAN, July 23, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/23/yemen-journalist-us-
drone-strike-released.
383. Id.
384. Amnesty Int'l, Amnesy International Report 2012: The State of the World's Human Rights, 367, 370,
Al Index POL 10/001/2012 (2012), available at http://fles.amnesty.org/airl2/air_2012_full.en.pdf.
385. Id.
386. See Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third to Fifth
Periodic Reports of the United States of America, 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Dec. 19,
2014) ("[The Committee considers that force-feeding of prisoners on hunger strike constitutes ill-
treatment in violation of the Convention. Furthermore, it notes that lawyers of detainees have argued
in court that force-feedings are allegedly administered in an unnecessarily brutal and
painful manner.").
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sphere of diffusion via coercion related to UNSCR 1373 for at least a
portion of the time under study. These states emulate the practice that the
P5 demonstrate or learn from the P5's success with counterterrorism
measures. These examples will further demonstrate that restricting human
rights while countering terrorism has become the new norm.
1. Switzerland
Switzerland has ratified the UN anti-terrorism conventions since
becoming a UN member state in 2002.387 Even beforehand, however,
Switzerland implemented its own terrorist sanctions along with the UN
Al-Qaeda Sanctions Lists, created in 1999 with the passage of UNSCR
1267.388 Switzerland's own sanctions list contains approximately forty-four
individuals or entities suspected of being connected with Al Qaeda or the
financing of its operations.389 Although these measures were not binding
on Switzerland in 1999 because the Swiss were not yet a UN member
state, Switzerland chose to take steps to combat the financing of terrorism
anyway. This could indicate norm diffusion via learning, since the Swiss
were not subject to any coercive measure mandating sanctions.
Evidence from the Committee for the Prevention of Torture has
surfaced recently suggesting that the Swiss authorities were guilty of
violating their international human rights obligations. Among alleged
violations were excessive force by police and the lack of a complaints
procedure in many administrative districts for victims of this violence.390
The Committee also noted that the administrative detention used for
foreigners was problematic.391 Similar violations of rights are seen
elsewhere in Europe, especially in the detention practices of the United
Kingdom and France.
The fact that Switzerland implemented its own version of the sanctions
list, which included the UN list as well, suggests learning from the United
Nations. Although the above discussion does not definitively prove that
Switzerland has learned from or emulated its European neighbors'
387. CODEXTER, Prfiles on Counter-Terrorist Capadty: Sitzerland, 6 (2014), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Country%/20Profiles/Profiles-2014-Switzerland-EN.pdf;
Press Release, General Assembly, With Admission of Switzerland, United Nations Family Now
Numbers 190 Member States, U.N. Press Release GA/10041 (Sept. 10, 2002); US Embasy Cables:
Switzerland and Counter-Terrorism, GUARDIAN, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-
embassy-cables-documents/50264.
388. US Embassy Cables: Switzerland and Counter-Terrorism, supra note 387; see S.C. Res. 1267, sopra
note 119.
389. US Embay Cables: Switzerland and Counter-Terrorism, stpra note 387.-
390. Reports Raise Concerns over Pracices in SwitZerland, ASS'N FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.apt.ch/en/news-onprevention/reports-raise-concems-over-practices-
in-switzerland/#.VNLPK2BOyM- (citing report providing these details).
391. Id.
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detention practices and ill treatment, the reports of the CPT are
highly suggestive.
2. South Sudan
South Sudan, as the newest state in the world, is struggling to meet its
Security Council-imposed obligations due to the ongoing conflict in the
region and the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).392 Such
struggles to meet its international obligations are arguably attributable to
the lack of stability, resources, and infrastructure.393
There are mixed interpretations of counterterrorism legislative efforts
in South Sudan. The U.S. Department of State found, in 2012, that the
new state had yet to pass any such legislation,394 whereas the Center on
Global Counterterrorism Cooperation noted at about the same time that
Sections 67 through 73 of South Sudan's Penal Code cover terrorism,395
and South Sudan has been slow to accede to international
counterterrorism conventions.396 South Sudan only recently passed
counterterrorism finance legislation, but the country lacks the
infrastructure to properly implement it.397 The Anti-Money Laundering
and Counter Terrorist Act defines terrorism as the "use of organized
intimidation or extreme fear to coerce a government or community,"398 yet
this definition mirrors similarly vague provisions in other states' laws.399
This broad definition leaves open the possibility of abuse by the
government to deem legitimate acts of expression as "terrorism."
392. See U.N. News Centre, UN Maintains Efforts Against Lord's Resistance Army - Senior
Officials (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41507#.VMG2F75YXww.
393. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2013, at 49 (2014) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2013 COUNTRY REPORTS],
availabk at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf ("South Sudan expressed a
commitment to countering terrorism, but [it] suffered from multiple institutional weaknesses that
impeded any counterterrorism efforts.').
394. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2011, at 33 (2012) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS], available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf.
395. The Penal Code Act, 2008, no. 9, §§ 67-73 (South Sudan), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fie-id=250684; CTR. ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION, FIGHTING TERROR THROUGH JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING THE IGAD FRAMEWORK
FOR LEGAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM 9-10 (2012), available at
http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/TaskForceReporMay2Ol2l .pdf.
396. CTR. ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, supra note 395, at 10.
397. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2013 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 393, at 50.
398. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Act, 2012, no. 51, § 5 (South Sudan), available
at http://www.icni.org/research/ibrary/files/South/ 2OSudan/AntiMoneyLaundering.pdf.
399. See supra Part III.A & C (describing vague definitions of "terrorism" or "extremism" in such
countries as Russia, China, Turkey, and Zimbabwe).
252 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although currently South Sudan lacks the infrastructure to sufficiently
combat terrorism,400 this may be changing as the state matures.
The Draft National Security Service Bill, introduced in 2014, has caused
great concern for the protection of human rights while protecting national
security. A coalition of human rights NGOs released a statement in
October 2014 on the status of the bill, warning that the bill's provisions
interfered with a number of protected rights, including freedom of speech
and the prohibition of arbitrary detention and torture.401 This coalition
points to states - some of which this Commentary has described as being
influenced by the P5 - that have similar structures in place and have
questionable human rights records.40 2 Although the bill initially passed
Parliament in October 2014, the President refused to sign it.403 Despite
this, members of Parliament have indicated that they may pass the bill
without the President's consent.404 If enacted, this particular law would
replicate existing counterterrorism legislation elsewhere and could be
evidence of emulation and learning from the P5.
Any human rights abuses related to counterterrorism may not be due to
norm diffusion, but, rather, the lack of rule of law in the state. Human
Rights Watch has documented violations of the freedom of speech and
the prohibition of arbitrary detention and torture, even outside the context
of counterterrorism.4 5 As South Sudan matures and stabilizes, its
400. U.S. STATE DEP'T, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 394, at 33 ("[South Sudan] suffers
from multiple institutional weaknesses that included insufficient policing and intelligence gathering,
inadequate border controls, and deficient aviation security and screening at the country's two
international airports in Juba and Malakal."); CTR. ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION, supra note 395, at 10 ("[South Sudan's] nascent infrastructure means that it struggles
simply to control its territory and borders, let alone engage in complex multijurisdictional
investigations and prosecutions.").
401. AMNESTY INT'L ET AL., COMMENTS ON THE 8 OCTOBER 2014 DRAFT NATIONAL
SECURITY SERVICE BILL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN 1 (2014), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/relateLmaterial/Commentary/2Oon%20the%20NSS/ 20
Bill%20-%200ctober/o2014%2C%202014.pdf.
402. Id. at 2 ("While vesting national security agencies with police powers is not in itself a
violation of international law, a review of state practice, namely in Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen, points at a clear correlation between the exercise of powers of arrest
and detention on the one hand, and allegations of violations such as arbitrary arrest and detention as
well as of torture at the hands of the respective security services on the other.").
403. South Sudan President Sends National Securidy Bill Back to Parliament, SOUTH SUDAN TODAY,
Dec. 21, 2014, http://southsudantoday.net/default/2014/12/21/south-sudan-president-sends-
national-security-bill-back-to-parliament/.
404. S. Sudan MPs Hint on Passing SecuiLy Bill IWithout PresidentialAssent, TALK OF SUDAN 0an. 10,
2015), http://talkofsudan.com/s-sudan-mps-hint-on-passing-security-bill-without-presidential-
assent/.
405. See, e.g., South Sudan: Rough Justice' in Lakes State, HUM. RTS. WATCH oune 24, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/24/south-sudan-rough-justice-lakes-state; South Sudan: Stop
Harassing Detaining Journahsts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 3, 2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/03/south-sudan-stop-harassing-detairing-joumalists; South
Sudan: Aritragy Detentions, Dire Poison Conditions, HUM. RTS. WATCH oune 21, 2012),
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adoption and implementation of counterterrorism law will further test this
Commentary's claim that there has been a global shift in the type of
norm diffused.
3. Montenegro
After Montenegro joined the United Nations in 2006,406 the country
brought its terrorist legislation into partial alignment with EU law, Council
of Europe law and jurisprudence, and relevant UN conventions.4 7 These
standards are enshrined in Montenegro's Criminal Code. Article 365
defines a terrorist as follows:
Anyone who, with the intention of endangering the constitutional
order and security of Montenegro... causes explosion or fire or
undertakes other dangerous measures or kidnaps a person, or
commits another act of violence or threats [sic] to undertake some
dangerous action or to use nuclear, chemical, bacteriological or
other dangerous substance and whereby may cause fear or feeling
of insecurity of citizens .... 408
This definition, which focuses specifically on the "endanger[ment] [of] the
constitutional order," and its application mirror that in other states,
particularly Russia and China. The circumstances are particularly
pronounced as applied to ethnic minorities.
In September 2006, Montenegrin officials arrested fourteen ethnic
Albanians in an anti-terrorist raid called "Eagles' Flight."409 Those
apprehended claimed that they were subjected to physical and verbal abuse
during their arrest and subsequent police custody.410 Ill treatment designed
to extract information included "slap[ping], punch[ing], and [being] kept in
a painful position" while awaiting court appearances in holding cells at the
Higher Court of Podgorica.411 Amnesty International reports that, in the
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/21 /south-sudan-arbitrary-detentions-dire-prison-conditions.
406. G.A. Res. 60/264, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/264 (July 12, 2006).
407. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2009, at 92 (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf; European Commission, Screening Report:
Montenegro, Chapter 24 - justice, Freedom and Security, at 13, MD 282/12 (2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/montenegro/screerting-reports/20130218-screening-report-
montenegro_ch24.pdf.
408. Criminal Code, 2003, no. 70/2003, art. 265, amended by Correction, 2004, no. 13/2004
(Montenegro); OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 407, at 92
n.10.
409. CPT, Council of Eur., Report to the Government of Montenegro on the Visit to Montenegro Carried out
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT) from 15 to 22 September 2008, 24, Doc. No. CPT/Inf (2010) 3 (2010), available at
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/mne/2010-03-inf-eng.pdf.
410. Id.
411. Id. While the report initially notes that this treatment "allegedlyl" occurred, it goes on to
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subsequent trials, evidence entered against the individuals had been
"extracted under duress or unlawfully obtained," presumably through
torture.412 Furthermore, when more than 100 people were arrested in 2009
for protesting Montenegro's recognition of Kosovo statehood, at least one
detainee claimed he was beaten by police officers.413
The CPT traveled to Montenegro in 2013 to monitor the situation of
detainees. The Committee found similar instances of torture and ill-
treatment, citing "allegations of deliberate physical [mis]treatment of
persons deprived of their liberty by the police," and indicating that the
majority of such allegations arose out of interrogation."414 Some instances
were so severe that they could amount to torture.
This behavior indicates a willingness to prioritize security over human
rights. Montenegro probably learned from, and emulates, its EU allies and
the United States, partly in an attempt to gain approval and admission to
the EU and NATO. 415 As additional evidence, the Special Anti-Terrorism
Unit of Montenegro was trained by both U.S. and international forces on
counterterrorism techniques in 2009.416 Perhaps Montenegro is learning
the wrong lessons from such training.
4. Kosovo
Although the majority of the P5 recognize Kosovo as a state, Russia
and China do not.417 Currently Kosovo is not a member state of the
state that these allegations were consistent with the physical evidence of abuse introduced in
court. Id.
412. Montenegro: Human Rights in the Republic of Montenegro, Annual Reports: 2009, AMNESTY INT'L,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/montenegro/report-2009.
413. Id.
414. CPT, Council of Eur., Report to the Government of Montenegro on the Visit to Montenegro Carred out
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT) from 13 to 20 Februay 2013, 14, Doc. No. CPT/Inf (2014) 16 (2014), available at
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/mne/2014-16-inf-eng.pdf.
415. See Ivana Jovanovic, OSCE Project Aims to Increase Regional Terrorism-Fighting Capacities,
SOUTHEASTERN EUR. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtm l/en .GB/features/setimes/features/2014/12/12/f
eature-01 (noting that a police capacity building project in Montenegro and neighboring countries is
managed by the OSCE and funded by a Swiss government agency); Drazen Remikovic, NATO
Praises Montenegro Miitagy Re]orms, SOUTHEASTERN EUR. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.setiunes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en.GB/features/setimes/features/2014/11/20/f
eature-01 (referencing Montenegro's desire to join NATO and the country's cooperation with
NATO).
416. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 407, at 93.
417. See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Russia's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on Kosovo (Feb. 17, 2008) (Russ.), available at
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp-4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/041c5af46913d38ac3
2573f30027b380!OpenDocument; Lu Jianchao, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson LiuJianchao's Regular Press Conference on February 19, 2008 (Feb. 20, 2008) (China),
available at http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t408646.htm. Russia's position generally remains
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United Nations, although it has aspirations.418 In consultation with the U.S.
Department of Justice, Kosovo has taken steps to improve its
counterterrorism legislation, including by implementing a new Criminal
Code.419 The Department of Counterterrorism (DCT) was formed out of
the police department's counterterrorism unit and became operational for
intelligence-gathering purposes by 2011.420 The DCT is working with the
Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the United States, the Organization for
Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), and other states to
improve the Department's capacity and to combat terrorism through
interagency information sharing.421
It is important to note the influence of NATO and its members -
including P5 members the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France - on Kosovo's counterterrorism strategy. Although NATO's
influence is substantial in the counterterrorism laws that have been passed,
both the United States and the United Kingdom have been individually
involved as well by providing counterterrorism training and advice.422
One cause for concern is that under the new Criminal Procedure Code,
it is easier to introduce evidence from other states into courts in
Kosovo.423 While this innovation could strengthen the prosecution of
international counterterrorism cases,424 special care must be taken so that
Kosovo does not join China or France in admitting evidence that was
extracted through torture.
unchanged, although it used Kosovo's independence to support its recent argument that Crimea
should be independent. China's position has remained unchanged.
418. See Kosovo Declaration of Independence arts. 8, 9, Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 ("With independence comes the duty of
responsible membership in the international community. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by
the principles of the United Nations Charter .... We intend to seek membership in international
organisations .... .
419. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 394, at 70-71.
420. Id. at 70.
421. Id. at 70-72.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 419 & 421; HOME DEPARTMENT, COUNTERING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S STRATEGY, 2006, Cm. 6888, at 15 (U.K.),
available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/272320/6888.pdf
("The [United Kingdom], as a part of NATO, played a leading role in the intervention in Kosovo...
and has played a significant role in the subsequent reconstruction programme."); Linda Karadaku,
Kosovo Co-Operates with EU, US in Fight Against Terrorism, SOUTHEASTERN EUR. TIM~ES
(Dec. 22, 2014),
http:/ /www.setimes.com/cocoon/setmes/xhtml/en GB/ features/setimes/ features/201 4/12/22/ f
eature-01 ("'Both the [United States] and the EU have helped Kosovo align its legislation with
international standards on the fight against terrorism,' Fisnik Korenica of the Kosovo Institute for
Legal Studies in Pristina told SETimes. 'In addition, both the EU and [United States] have helped the
police and the prosecution with different programs to make [Kosovo] more capable of dealing with
serious crimes including terrorism."').
423. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2013 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 393, at 103.
424. Id.
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CONCLUSIONS
There is a new "normalization of deviance,"425 whereby, over time, the
restriction of human rights in the name of security has become the norm
rather than the exception. With UNSCR 1373 as the driver of change in
counterterrorism laws worldwide and the P5 as a model for other states,
states across the globe adopted this norm. As this Commentary discussed,
the prioritization of security over human rights is observable not only in
states with repressive regimes, such as Zimbabwe or Egypt, but also in
rights-promoting states, such as the signatories of the ECHR, which are
typically viewed as bolstering human rights instead of restricting them.
While states can enact laws that retain or protect human rights, for
those states examined in this Commentary, compliance with international
human rights standards has been severely lacking since September 11. The
P5 have set the standard of non-compliance for the rest of the world,
enabling diffusion via learning. States have also been coerced, via some
combination of UNSCR 1373 and aid funding, into a similar prioritization.
Also, states have emulated the practice of the P5 in hopes of gaining
access to regional organizations or acceptance of their actions by the
international community.
Therefore, given the now preponderance of state practice, a new norm
can be said to have emerged - the norm of compromising human rights
in the name of security, diffused by the very powers that should be
protecting these rights. The human rights norm, as Rosemary Foot put it,
is barely surviving in the fight against terrorism.426 The accumulation of
state practice in direct contravention of these rights in favor of national
security has significantly curtailed the human rights norm where terrorism
is involved. As states have been coerced, emulated practice, and learned
from the P5, a negative norm has diffused globally and changed the game
for norm diffusion.
425. VAUGHAN, supra note 90.
426. See Foot, spra note 2, at 490.
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